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1. Within or Without the West? 
Russia is in the midst of one of the most difficult periods in its history. For the first time in the past 200–300 
years, it is facing a real danger of sliding to the second, and possibly even third, echelon of world states. We 
are running out of time to avoid this. […] Nobody will do it for us. Everything depends on us and us alone 
(Putin 1999:219).  
1.1 Introduction  
The political leadership of the Russian Federation has played an inconsistent, if not 
unclear, role in the process of shaping the architecture of European security. The end 
of the Cold War introduced an era of politically unpredictable constellations in 
international security as leading world powers converted former patterns of enmity 
into bases for collaboration. In Europe, the most profound transformation took place 
on post-Soviet territory. Practically overnight, after the failed coup against 
Gorbachev, the Soviet superpower crumbled and an emerging Russia had to find its 
new place on the international arena. The central administration of the infant Russian 
Federation1 had to cope with a floundering great power status, an economic 
recession, and a constant fear of mass social instability. Even if the days of 
superpower are over, there is still popular and political consensus that Russia must 
always remain a great power (Oldberg 2005:29). As a result, all aspects of domestic 
and foreign policies were continuously defined as security related. Consequently, the 
post-Cold War Russian debate on national interests emphasized the maintenance of 
international recognition through the protection of state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, and economic development.  
During the 1990s, Russian foreign policies ebbed and flowed between pro-Western 
and anti-Western approaches to international security. The Westernizers, also called 
Atlanticists, predominated Russian strategic thinking under Minister of Foreign 
                                              
1 Hereafter also referred to as Russia. 
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Affairs Kozyrev, who wanted to orient Russian diplomacy to Western Europe and the 
USA (Sergounin 2004:20). In 1996, the succeeding Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Primakov was particularly forthright when he stressed the need for a multipolar 
world. Primakov advocated a pan-European economic space and warned against 
American unilateralism. To all intents and purposes, such visions were ultimately 
based on Russia’s fear of the USA as the unquestionable and only remaining 
superpower. Russia reached out to Western Europe in an attempt to establish power 
balance against the old archenemy. In this context, Vladimir Putin’s first presidential 
term seemed like a shift away from this balancing act towards a pro-Western 
orientation (Polikanov and Timmins 2004).  
The departure point for this thesis is the situation in 1999, often referred to as 
Russia’s ‘moment of truth’ (D. Lynch 2003:11) and there are several reasons for this. 
First, the Russian people, together with the political administration, entered the new 
millennium both at a political and economic nadir and they aspired for a new political 
strategy. This was also the year when NATO intervened militarily in Kosovo, when 
Russia returned troops to Chechen territory, and when financial irregularities created 
a feverish public debate on Russian corruption2. Of these three predicaments, the first 
and the second caused a revision of Russia’s main policy concepts3, while the third 
provoked a massive distaste for Yeltsin’s leadership. The new government was not 
intimidated from speaking of first-use of nuclear weapons (Godzimirski 2000:87), at 
the same time as they endorsed economic cooperation with the West. The appointed 
President Putin stressed that Russia had national interests “in the development of 
international cooperation on equal terms and to mutual benefit” (NSC 2000:2). He 
emphasized repeatedly that such interests “may be assured only on the basis of 
sustainable economic development” (NSC 2000:2). The overall message seemed to 
                                              
2 In September 2000, the World Bank released a report that singled out Russia among other CEEC, as countries where 
oligarchs and powerful private actors were establishing or strengthening monopolies by bribing judges, legislators and 
administrators (Synovitz 2000). See also World Bank Policy, Research Paper No 2444 (Hellman et al 2000:10).     
3 These were the National Security Concept (NSC), the Military Doctrine (MD) and the Foreign Policy Concept (FPC) of 
the Russian Federation  
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be that Russia was ready to cooperate on equal terms but did not accept to be dictated 
in any ways (Zivanov 2000:17). Russia engaged in a strategic partnership with the 
West aimed to strengthen economic ties with Western Europe and to support a more 
independent role in international relations. Already in February 2000, acting 
President Putin hosted the formal visit of NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson. 
But most remarkable of the new strategic thinking was Putin’s endorsement of US 
military bases in what has traditionally been Russia’s sphere of influence. Whereas 
military officials opposed the new alignment (Reynolds 2001, Trenin and Lo 2005:4) 
some called it “revolutionary” (Medvedev 2004). Other again meant that President 
Putin had “ended centuries of wavering between East and West and made a strategic 
choice that the country’s future lies unequivocally in Europe” (Gordon 2002).  
1.2 Thesis Question 
This thesis sets out to analyze Russia’s relations with the West during Putin’s first 
presidential period, and examine political motives that might have contributed to 
Russia’s new type of engagement with the West between 1999 and 2004. This thesis 
will attempt to answer the following question: What were the dominant motives 
behind President Putin’s choice of seeking strategic partnership with the West from 
1999 – 2004? In this context, ‘dominant motives’ set out to portray prevalent national 
interests and the according proactive argumentation that Russia’s leadership applied 
in strategy documents. ‘Strategic partnership’ points to the political will to cooperate 
in specific areas but without seeking membership. This theoretical concept relates to 
Russia’s long term quest for national security and power balance in the multipolar 
system through cooperation with the West, and more specifically with the two 
Western organizations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
European Union (EU). This question is important because research findings may shed 
light both on the alternatives and on the political priorities of the early Putin 
administration and on courses of action that were available. It may, moreover, add to 
an understanding of whether Russia’s orientation towards the West was part of an 
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ideological strategy or a series of pragmatic solutions to vulnerabilities and 
opportunities.  
The guiding assumption of this project is that the Russian President engaged in 
strategic partnerships with the West because traditional strategic thinking favoured 
great power status. Great power status had to be sustained in both the political-
military and the economic sectors of foreign affairs. This point of view draws on the 
Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) and assumptions therein. The RSCT is a 
theoretical combination of Neo-Realist assumptions of power structure and 
territoriality, and of Constructivist interpretations of dynamics of securitization. It is 
furthermore a theoretical approach that studies the regional level of international 
interactions (Buzan and Wæver 2003). Essentially, dynamics of securitization in the 
international system will define a regional level of interdependent units (ibid.). RSCT 
also serves to assess options and consequences of the projection of influence in the 
international system (ibid.:47). The options that a state has for manoeuvring in the 
international system are shaped by the domestic and the international context. 
Domestic political disorder and political transition in general could render a state 
more war prone (Oliker and Charlick-Paley 2002:2-3). A weak state may therefore 
use violence as means of fostering internal unity (ibid.). Domestic vulnerabilities may 
cause impediments on economic progress or leave the state in dependency. 
Alignment between global powers could serve as means to achieve international 
recognition and preferred status.  
1.3 Methodological Framework  
Methodology 
In this thesis, the analysis will be conducted as a case study with focus on Russian 
foreign policy vis-à-vis the West and Russian motivation for building strategic 
partnerships with the Western institutions, NATO and the EU. A case study is an 
intensive empirical investigation, in which the lines between the phenomenon 
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(Russian international strategies), and its context (political crisis), are uncertain (Yin 
2003). When selecting a case the actors in question should have similar problems, the 
same type of actors should be involved, the actors should be organised in a similar 
manner, and the case in question should uphold similar significance to the 
surroundings at large (Andersen 2003:104). This particular case is Russian foreign 
policy priorities between the year 1999 and 2004. The question, moreover, is how 
strategic cooperation with the selected Western institutions was presented in Russian 
official discourse. The above criteria are fulfilled because NATO and the EU both 
aspire to increasingly include the Russian Federation into Western ideals of ruling, 
because they make up great power actors, and because they are both crucial for the 
maintenance of Russia’s own great power ambitions. The unit in this case study is the 
Russian Federation under President Putin during his first period going from 1999 to 
2004. 
Henceforth, when this study examines Russia’s national interests relative to two quite 
different security institutions, NATO and the EU, it must necessarily be based on an 
analysis of a complex matrix of dynamics. The study focuses, therefore, on an actor’s 
perspective, on in-depth understanding of the case, and on the questions ‘why’ and 
‘how’. Finally, it sets out to develop causal effects (Andersen 2003).  
In studies of International Relations, the methodological norm has been to apply the 
level of the nation state as the referent object of threat to security. This study will be 
based mostly on an analysis of political rhetoric and focus will be on official 
documents and statements. It is an inherent weakness therefore that “the relationship 
between a person’s statements and his motives, personality, intentions, and the like, is 
at best only vaguely understood” (Holsti 1969:32). For that reason, this research 
cannot lead to one single answer but can, at best, synthesize the motives in relation to 
each other. 
In order to answer this project’s question, these documents and statements will be 
analyzed in the broader context of what is referred to as Russia’s strategic thinking. 
The concept of strategic culture is useful here as it helps the researcher reduce 
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uncertainty in making predictions on strategic choice and subsequent behaviour. 
Strategic culture offers a set of limited options and ranked preferences in the decision 
making processes that persist over time and contexts (Johnston 1995:53). Or, the 
concept may serve as a lens that amends the appearance of different choices. More 
specifically, it is supposed to provide decision-makers with a set of choices, from 
which academics can derive predictions on strategic behaviour. One should, however, 
not study behaviour indiscriminately as a result of strategic culture (ibid.:45-46). As 
opposed to other researchers of strategic culture, Johnston (1995) concluded that one 
should not analyze strategic culture as if it were state particular. This analytical tool is 
helpful because it structures a larger context of events and discourses, and serves as a 
point of reference in security studies.  
In the multipolar constellation of world power a new type of institutionalization 
surfaced. Strategic partnerships are loose forms of association that encompasse more 
than cooperation, but less than membership. The strategic component in this type of 
partnership includes mutual terms of cooperation and “a common understanding of 
shared norms and human values” (Yilmaz 2007:3). Hence, the political foundation of 
a strategic partnership rests on the involved parties’ determination to reach beyond 
their differences in values and instead build on common interests and shared political 
goals. The concept bears great political precedence for a number of reasons. 
According to theory of balance of power (Tsygicho in Heikka 2000:29), strategic 
stability in the international system could be maintained in one of three ways: parity, 
strategic partnership, or unipolar hegemony. Parity prevailed during the bipolar 
power system of the Cold War, whereas strategic partnerships among different poles 
would better maintain a power balance in the present multipolar system. Strategic 
partnerships may serve the actors instrumentally or they may function as mere 
rhetorical acts between two power seeking actors. For example, Russia will cooperate 
with the West and contribute to a ‘benign security environment’ as long as President 
Putin remains convinced that this is what Russia’s economic recovery requires 
(Goldman 2002:21). Furthermore, strategic partnerships are based on policy areas of 
common interests albeit sometimes only partly. For example, the Bush-Putin Summit 
 11
in May 2002 issued a Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship that agreed 
on concrete areas of cooperation, while simultaneously identifying issues of 
divergence.   
Strategic partnerships are often a combination of interest based quid pro quo-policies 
and efforts to create stabilising institutions in lack of norms in the post-bipolar era. 
And, as referred to above, the underlying policies in strategic partnerships are based 
on sober assessments of interests and limitations to other alternatives (Goldman 
2002). In sum, security discourses and the according constellations of strategic 
partnerships are products of international structures in time as well as results of 
domestic or international struggles for power and understandings of the situation of 
the countries involved. 
The concept of ‘strategic partnership’ has been centrally, albeit ambiguously, 
incorporated in Russia’s dialogue with NATO and, particularly since 1999, with the 
European Union. Within the scope of this thesis, Russia’s strategic partnership with 
the West has been limited actors to embody the central administration’s dialogues 
with NATO and with the European Union. These two actors account for most 
European countries as well as North America. Although the Russian Federation is 
neither a member of NATO nor of the European Union, the agreements that 
nonetheless exist between them indicate the mutual post-Cold War interests in 
strengthening European integration in security and economic affairs. They are 
powerful because they shape national strategies and induce conformity to established 
conventions and norms. They may even amend national interests and the mandates 
that states have to act in international affairs. In general, security institutions “are 
designed to protect the territorial integrity of states from the adverse use of military 
force [and] to guard states’ autonomy against the political effects of the threat of such 
force” (Wallander et al. 1998:1-2). The EU, however, does not originate from the 
same principle but sustains the potential for Russia’s economic growth and expansion 
of the export market. As a result, NATO, together with the European Union, make up 
the most influential security actors on two continents. They incorporate two types of 
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security paradigms: a military institution with sharp end capabilities as laid out in 
NATO’s Article 4 of international peace and security and Article 5 of collective 
defence, and a soft power institution with non-military sanctioning power through an 
open enlargement and positive integration policy.  
What henceforth constitutes the current strategic partnership between the Russian 
Federation and the West includes agreements, top political summits, and practical 
cooperation in a number of issues, such as non-proliferation, crises management and 
economic affairs. The core agreements that subsequently, but not inevitably, led to 
Russia’s cooperation with the West were above all the 1994 Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement with the EU and the 1997 Founding Act with NATO. 
Strategic partnership in this case does not refer to future membership in any of the 
two institutions. Russia has neither applied nor released any plans to do so.   
There are several challenges to the operationalization and application of ‘strategic 
partnership’ as a theoretical concept. Firstly, analytical problems arise because the 
term is extensively used to freely name a policy area of great diversity; namely, 
Russia’s strategic cooperation with international partners. Secondly, the term alludes 
to such a loose institutionalisation of power that it barely sustains any political clout. 
Lastly, the term has obviously portrayed EU–Russian relations more frequently than 
NATO–Russia relations. However, despite the ambiguity encompassing this concept, 
applying ‘strategic partnership’ to the core of methodology allows for the inclusion of 
ideological values, such as cultural affinity, international compliance as well as 
pragmatic and even instrumentalist interests. Because of the different qualities of 
Russian activities with the West, this particular concept upholds the advantage of 
analyzing a wide range of relevant variables.         
Limitation 
In 2000, the three main official strategy documents were revised and reissued. These 
documents plus one speech have since been Russia’s official guidelines in security 
policy. In order to carry out this project, the text material has been selected from 
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Putin’s speech in 1999; “Russia at the Turn of the Millennium”, from the National 
Security Concept of the Russian Federation (NSC), the Foreign Policy Concept of the 
Russian Federation (FPC), and from the Russian Federation Military Doctrine (MD), 
all from the year 2000. External and domestic events had spurred the revision of the 
concepts. Essentially, the main causes were linked to Russia’s severe economic 
recession, with further NATO enlargement into previous Soviet territory (particularly 
with the NATO intervention in Kosovo), and not least with the increased military 
confidence after Russia’s intervention in Chechnya (Godzimirski 2000:73). The 
revision of the concepts owed also to the new Russian leadership. Together, this text 
material conveyed the platform of policies in the Russian administration after the 
momentous experiences of 1999 and served as a starting point for comparison over 
time.  
These texts were compared with the President’s Annual Addresses to the Federal 
Assembly (AA) between 2000 and 2004. The first Annual Address (2000) conveyed 
the sober message to the Russian population of what was needed to possibly 
overcome the economic and political crises. For the most part, this Address 
communicated the core threats to Russian national security and the measures by 
which to defend against them. Furthermore, an Annual Address could also be a forum 
for clarifying provisions and supplements to the Military Doctrine (MD 2000:3). It is 
important to keep in mind that the 2000 strategy documents were different in quality 
and in nature from the subsequent Annual Addresses. The former set was in depth 
ideological and political platforms for Russia’s national interests in foreign and 
security policy, whereas the addresses were wrapped in more popular connotations, 
repetitions, and denoted more of a political character. The recipient groups were also 
dissimilar, because the Annual Addresses were delivered to the Federal Assembly 
with the general masses as an implicit and complementary target group. This thesis 
intends to examine two sets of texts. It will however not focus on their different 
structures but instead examine this content over the particular time period. 
Furthermore, they are all prepared by the President’s Office and all of them cover the 
political areas of national interests.  
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Realistically, there is an indefinite number of variables at play in the official 
documents selected. The challenge is to keep optimal levels of validity and reliability. 
Whereas validity refers to systematic measurement errors, reliability points to random 
errors. By high validity is meant precise operationalization of concepts and variables. 
In qualitative research, moreover, validity is a question of personal understanding of 
the subject matter (Hellevik 1995:95), and much of the interpretation is left to the 
researcher’s academic abilities. Inter-subjectivity is, for similar reasons, prone to 
jeopardize qualitative research. It is crucial to be explicit in terms of the 
operationalization of concepts and variables that are essential to this thesis. For 
example, when linked to individual and societal levels of analysis, there are 
practically no limits as to what the security concept is not. With a desire to achieve 
highest possible validity and reliability criteria, this current thesis is aware that “an 
abstract idea of ‘security’ is a non-analytical term bearing little relation to the concept 
of security implied by national or state security” (Wæver 1995:48). An all-inclusive 
security policy is therefore fruitless, if not altogether impossible.  
Structure of Thesis 
In order to pursue explanations along political and economic vulnerabilities and 
opportunities, the thesis question will be technically discussed in two sections. In the 
first one this thesis will focus on Russia’s political position. The protection of state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and multipolarity and alignment are two 
territorial variables from the political discourse that may have evoked the need for 
strategic partnerships. Rightly, multipolarity and alignment are more ideologically 
based, but have most often been based in geo-political reasoning and are therefore 
measured as territorial. Second, an analysis of an economic variable examines 
whether strategic partnerships were guided by prospects of economic growth and 
integration. This split allows for an examination of two somewhat different 
discourses: the security focused one, and the economic one.   
The applied independent variables, furthermore, define the main structure of the 
theoretical framework. The overarching intention is to assemble an assessment of the 
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applied variables. An end result of purely causal character is likely ideal and might 
not be feasible, because the motives are complex and a combination of several 
interests. In accordance with the theoretical foundation of this study, the following 
independent variables incorporate the main great power vulnerabilities and 
opportunities of the Russian Federation. A reason for this type of classification is to 
get an understanding of what impelled Russian government in their strategic thinking 
about the West.  
The two first variables are in the applied theory defined as territorial, whereas the last 
is non-territorial. The omnipresent assumption is that Russia overtly wants to become 
a great power that is respected regionally and internationally. But this does not alone 
explain why Russia turned to the West. The methodological and theoretical 
framework should in concurrence help explain Russia’s association with the West. 
Variable one, state sovereignty and territorial integrity, is operationalized to include 
Russia’s restoration project, the preservation of the regime’s status quo, and strategic 
stability within and around the federal borders. In foreign affairs this alluded to 
Russia’s involvement in international decision making in the UN Security Council 
above all. Empirically, the central discussion revolves around the aftermath of 
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. The second variable, multipolarity and alignment, 
defines two security constellations and distribution of power in world affairs. The 
concept of multipolarity4 is interpreted and operationalized as an opportunity that the 
Russian political elite pragmatically supported in order to provide an alternative to a 
unipolar world. The relevant discussion will concentrate on the change in Russian 
strategic thinking away from balancing against the USA and to proactive alignment 
with the West. Variable three, economic weakness, takes into consideration the 
negative consequences of the financial crisis during the previous presidency and the 
resolute demand for economic integration. Putin entered his first presidency with a 
promise to reinsert Russia among the world’s most affluent economies. Any mention 
                                              
4 Multipolarity must be differentiated from another concept most commonly applied to economic relations; multilateralism. Closely related 
in the texts appear multilateralism and bilateralism, which concepts served to indicate the number of participants in specific matters.    
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in the text material of policies on building Russia’s economic power is thus of 
analytical interest.  
In order to achieve methodological consistency in this analysis, the international 
system of interactions will serve as the analytical level and this thesis will focus on 
Russia’s official strategy documents as a basis for policies. This is because the global 
level is where Russia’s great power ambitions enfold. The analysis is thus based 
exclusively on a qualitative study of the above mentioned documents signed and 
issued by the office of the Russian President.  
Henceforth, the analytical unit is the Office of the President of the Russian Federation 
which is the formal leading institution of Russian policy making. President Putin may 
serve as the sole policy manufacturer, while the Foreign Ministry has the formal 
responsibility for coordination and implementation. Like his predecessor Yeltsin, 
President Putin also has the function of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, 
and has direct control over foreign policy and security related ministries5. The 
President heads and appoints the Security Council, and oversees a presidential 
administration containing departments and advisers dealing with foreign policy 
(Webber and Smith 2002:151). Particularly in post-Soviet and Russian strategic 
culture, any modification of a country’s relative power status is primarily a result of 
the personality of the state’s political elite (Kokoshin 2002). For sure, Vladimir Putin 
reinstituted Russia’s historical norm of strong leadership, which had been set aside 
during Yeltsin (Trenin and Lo 2005:9).  
This thesis draws upon post-Cold War security literature of the Copenhagen School 
and more specifically upon Regional Security Complex Theory from 2003. Authors 
Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003) set out the applied portion of the theoretical 
framework, whereas the constructivist component is set out by both Barry Buzan, 
Jaap de Wilde, and Ole Wæver and (1998) and Ronnie D. Lipschutz (1995). Set in 
                                              
5 These are, above all, the Foreign and Defence Ministries, and the Foreign and Intelligence Federal Border Services 
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the context of relevant academic literature, Regional Security Complex Theory is a 
contrast to Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations theory, and an addition to Wendt’s 
constructivist approach (Buzan and Wæver 2003:41). This thesis also draws on 
academic research by experts on Russian affairs. These are mainly Henrikki Heikka 
(2000), Alastair Iain Johnston (1995) and Iver B. Neumann (2005) on strategic 
thinking, Alexander A. Sergounin (2004) on Russian international relations theories, 
Dov Lynch (2003) on Russian relations with Europe, and Allen C. Lynch (2002) on 
economic aspects. 
In sum, this section has elaborated on the concept of strategic partnership, which is a 
loose form of institution building in a multipolar security constellation. This type of 
partnership is based on interests more than on values in common, and the Russian 
main national interest in the period in question was to remain a great power. A 
qualitative text analysis will lead the main discussion to an appropriate conclusion on 
motivation. The ensuing discussion will summarize some particularly important 
moments in post-Soviet history that have shaped Russian strategic thinking. This 
study will then turn to a consideration of the theoretical perspectives, followed by the 
main discussion of text material. Finally, this study will offer some conclusions about 
the dominant motives behind Putin’s strategic partnership with the West.  
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2. Decisive Moments in Russian Strategic Thinking  
Russia was and will remain a great power. It is preconditioned by the inseparable characteristics of its 
geopolitical, economic, and cultural existence. […] For Russians, a strong state is not an anomaly to be 
gotten rid of. Quite the contrary, it is a source of order and main driving force of any change (Putin 1999: 
214).  
2.1 Russian Grand Strategy  
This chapter attempts to demonstrate the particular moments in post-Soviet history 
that have shaped Russian strategic thinking under President Putin. The focus will be 
on political, military and economic crises in which the young federation found itself 
in the decade from the dissolution of the Soviet Union leading up when President 
Putin was appointed. The critical point arrived when NATO intervened in Kosovo.  
By definition, a grand strategy is the state’s collection of political and military means 
and ends with which to achieve national security (Posen 1984 in Neumann and 
Heikka 2005:12). A grand strategy is the state’s theory of how it can best protect 
national security. The strategy should explain what threats exist and why the applied 
means are appropriate (ibid.). Russia’s grand strategy as laid out in the National 
Security Concept of 2000 aims in more detail to ensure the “security of the 
individual, society and state against external and internal threats in any aspects of life 
and activity” (NSC 2000:1). Since the beginning of the Russian state in the ninth 
century, the country’s grand strategy has been characterized by imperialist 
expansionism (Buzan and Wæver 2003:398). Traditionally, Russian grand strategy 
has been a set of clear trends that may be described as a “drive to the West”, a “drive 
to the sea” or as a “drive to the Middle East oil fields” (Heikka 2000:4). For example, 
a “preference for pre-emptive, offensive uses of force that was deeply rooted in 
Russia’s history of external expansionism and internal autocracy” characterised 
Soviet strategic thinking (Johnston 1995:1). The bipolar arms race shaped political 
and military strategies. In the post-Soviet period, on the contrary, Russian grand 
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strategies have been less rigid and more pronounced on respecting international 
norms. Russian grand strategy during the 1990s was characterised by a general 
agreement to soften the focus on military power and increase cooperation with 
European counterparts. Sergounin made a thorough distinction along the dividing 
lines of liberalism from the Atlanticists / Westernizers, Eurasianists, Realists, Neo-
Marxists, in addition to Russian Post-Modernists (Sergounin 2004). Broadly 
speaking, there were two main groups of grand strategy proposals: the political 
realists versus those who continued to advocate for communism. As a result, the 
strategic debate came to revolve around the concept of multipolarity (Heikka 
2000:25). Webber and Smith confirmed that “official statements from the Russian 
leadership after 1992 bear witness of a new Russia who turned away from her 
previous policy of ‘Atlanticism’ and took an asserted stand in support of 
‘Multipolarism’” albeit limited in scope and effect (Webber and Smith 2002:159).  
Without abandoning multipolarity explicitly, Russia engaged concomitantly in 
special bilateral relations with major European partners, such as France and Germany 
under Yeltsin, together with the UK under Putin (Baranovsky 2000:454). 
Furthermore, in 2003 the Russian administration decided to supply the US and allied 
forces in Afghanistan with humanitarian support. This was an unprecedented act and 
signalled a shifting strategy in favour of making pro-American international 
cooperation efforts more important in Russian security affairs (D. Lynch 2003:11). 
When the extent of political impulsiveness is taken into consideration, then a study of 
grand strategy is particularly difficult in a country like Russia. “The record of post-
Cold War Russian foreign policy is so full of reckless moves and unpredictable u-
turns, that it seems rather far-fetched to suggest that there could be, even in theory, a 
common logic behind it” (Heikka 2000:3). Hence, grand strategy is, in content, much 
more loosely defined compared to the more concrete geo-strategic impressive plans 
of imperialism. According to Heikka again, the official policy concepts and doctrines 
spell out Russia’s vow to multipolarity as a balancing act against US hegemony. 
Even if it were only a vague political strategy, it would still be a component adding to 
Russian grand strategy at large.  
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Formation Years 
In December 1991, during the first meeting of the newly established North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council (NACC)6, the Soviet ambassador was informed that the USSR 
had dissolved and that he, for the latter part of the meeting, represented only the 
Russian Federation (NATO 2005:4) The founding enemy had disappeared and 
NATO was, ipso facto, expected to do the same.  
To the contrary, NATO instead initiated security cooperation across the previous 
East-West divide and managed a simultaneous twofold enlargement. That involved 
both increasing the number of member states7 as well as extending the core tasks 
from purely defence matters to peacekeeping and crisis management in support of the 
UN and the OSCE. The New Strategic Concept of 1990 had already issued positive 
changes in a new security environment, e.g. state sovereignty to former Soviet 
satellites, full membership to an integrated Germany, and a lowered arms level. As a 
result of continuous reformation, in 1994 NATO launched the Partnership for Peace 
(PfP), which defined new ways of practical bilateral cooperation between NATO and 
individual countries, including Russia (NATO 2005:5). The formal acceptance in 
1995 of NATO admitting new members from the CEEC immediately disturbed 
Russia’s political administration. Inability to influence the economic and legal 
structure of the international system was a de facto threat to Russia’s national security 
(Kassianova 2001:833).  
Despite NATO’s attempts to facilitate enlargement without alarming Russia (Sakwa 
1996:134), the Russian government was provoked regardless and exclaimed that 
“NATO expansion would mean the return of the ‘flames of war’ to Europe” (A. 
Lynch 2002:169). NATO enlargement infringed upon Russia’s special status as a 
                                              
6 NATO’s Heads of State and Government implemented in 1991 the NACC as a step towards operational transformation of NATO, this 
council changed in 1997 name to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) 
7 NATO admitted 10 new members in two swift rounds; the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999, and Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004.    
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nuclear power because NATO presence on post-Soviet soil was perceived as Western 
control and mobilization in Russia’s backyard. To complicate matters, other flames of 
war had arisen within the Russian Federation’s territory.  
In 1991, along with former USSR member states, the Chechen Republic of North 
Caucasus declared independence. This claim was denied by the Russian Federation. 
While the Kremlin discussed alternatives for Chechen devolution, it never intended 
on extending full sovereignty, whereas Chechnya aimed for CIS membership (Trenin 
2001:185). In Chechnya, the self proclaimed Commander in Chief imposed Sharia 
law and declared a ‘Holy War’ on Russia (Panico 1997:7). Chechen secessionism 
was once a popular movement but developed into an increasingly militarist group 
with political in-fights. The situation in the south was out of control and became 
unbearable for the Russian administration. In December 1994, Yeltsin ordered 
Russian military forces to Groznyy and planned for a swift victory. One year and 
eight months later, in August 1996, Russian troops were defeated and the two sides 
signed a cease-fire agreement that postponed further decisions. This operation came 
with many costs and clearly demonstrated that Russian military was in a state of 
crisis. President Yeltsin’s popular support plummeted, the national economy drained, 
and international support was withdrawn. The Council of Europe and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) severely criticised the 
Russian use of disproportionate force in Chechnya. 
Before Russia’s second war in Chechnya from 1999 to 2000, Chechnya had 
descended into anarchy. The economy had collapsed and kidnapping for ransom had 
become an important income for warlords. For Russia, the fighting was intense and 
devastating to the forces’ morale. Russian soldiers, it was told, were trading their 
ammunition for narcotics whereas Chechens were buying guns from the Russians 
(Oliker 2001:50). When on March 1999 the elected Chechen president dissolved the 
parliament, the situation intensified (Bowker 2004:260). However, it took some 
convincing conspiracy theories, a Chechen invasion into Dagestan, and a series of 
terrorist atrocities before the Russian administration decided to intervene militarily 
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again in the secessionist republic of Chechnya8. As opposed to the previous war, the 
1999 Russian intervention in Chechnya was a well planned political strategy that 
increased the popularity of the acting President Putin. It also offered a long sought 
after solution to the spread of Chechen terrorism into the Russian Federation. The 
second war did not end up in an acceptable solution to any of the parts, and the 
continuation of terrorist acts in the Russian Federation illustrates the significance of 
territorial integrity. 
2.2 Finacial and Political Crises 
Economic Vulnerabilities 
In addition to the military drain in Chechnya during the late 1990s, the Russian state 
was on the brink of bankruptcy. Great financial difficulties followed when Yeltsin 
was challenged to turn a planned economy into a market economy. During the first 
two years of the Russian Federation, consumer prices had increased by 2509 percent! 
And they continued to rise another 840 percent in 1993 (Cooper 2003:7). 
Accordingly, in 2000 the real GDP9 was less than 80 percent of what it had been in 
1992 (ibid.). In order to better assist this transfer, President Yeltsin decided in 
January 1992 on a ‘shock therapy’ that was comprised of three elements: 
liberalisation, stabilisation, and privatisation of the Russian economy. Liberalisation, 
in this case, meant discharging heavy subsidies and resulted in a 350 percent higher 
prices on food and basic commodities in the following month (Waller 2005:193). The 
IMF, therefore, enforced economic stability. Subsequently, the State Bank started to 
give out credit to enterprises and to the government, which in turn meant printing 
new money followed, not unexpectedly, by inflation. Hence, on 13 August 1998, the 
rouble was devaluated by two thirds. Lastly, privatisation meant selling state owned 
                                              
8 On the considerable numbers of casualties, see Oliker 2001:50, Bowker 2004:265, and Cornell 2003:20. 
9 Real GDP is adjusted for inflation.  
 23
property and thereby giving the population possibilities to invest in real estate and 
enterprises. The pitfall, however, was that the workers and managers bought shares in 
their employing enterprises at such low prices that the state was left with little to no 
income from these transactions (Waller 2005:193-4). Effectively, the financial 
depression that hit Russia between 1990 and 1998 struck much harder than the 
depression of the 1930s in the capitalist world (A. Lynch 2002:32). Developing 
relations with the European market was pivotal to Russia’s economic recovery.    
Of course, relations with an expanding European Union were not less complex than 
those Russia had with NATO. After two years of difficult trade negotiations, Russia 
and the European Union had agreed in June of 1994 to the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA). Although this agreement did not enter into force until 
199710, it was an ambitious element of promoting trade relations. Most importantly, 
the PCA aimed at strengthening political and economic freedoms, supporting 
Russia’s transition to democracy, and providing a framework for gradual integration 
between Russia and Europe. Furthermore, the PCA also aspired to establish a free 
trade area between Member States and Russia in a later stage of the cooperation 
process. Some have argued that the PCA arranged for a more formal and less 
practical cooperation institution. A former British Ambassador said in 1999 that “the 
practical results of the PCA have been disappointing”. He referred then to a 
discontent that may have stemmed from the tendency of Russia wanting to control the 
speed of reform as well as to protect certain sectors of the economy (D. Lynch 
2003:56). Subsequently in the 1999 Common Strategy on Russia (CSR), the EU 
launched its first complete vision of relations with a third party. The document was 
based on the PCA but defined its terms of cooperation more clearly.  
                                              
10 This was due to the on-going Chechen war. 
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International Relations 
Not only did it stir negative and anti-western sentiment in the Russian public, the 
NATO intervention against the former Russian ally in Kosovo provoked Russia to 
cancel, albeit only briefly, a number of crucial international treaties11 .Undoubtedly, 
the intervention had a devastating impact on Russia’s great power status and a 
calamitous effect on all Russian international relations. First of all, it may have 
caused the redirection of Russia’s foreign policy. Next, it set a new standard in 
international law. Russia’s sharpest non-military tools in international decision-
making, i.e. the UN Charter, were literally cut off. Russian veto in the UN Security 
Council, although legally binding and thus sufficient to stop NATO from imposing 
power, did not constrain NATO headquarters. The UN had landed on four 
resolutions12 that were acceptable also to the Russian position in the Security 
Council. This political elimination of Russia from decision making power was 
particularly devastating when added to the loss of military capabilities. Russian 
armed forces, which once claimed superpower status, could not even compare with 
NATO’s procurements and mobility. The Russian military budget had been reduced 
by 50 per cent during the three years from 1997 to 1999, and, in 2000, the Russian 
defence budget was 2 percent of that of the US (Arbatov 2000:5-6). The deficit in 
capabilities combined with the political impasse forced the Russian administration to 
reconsider its foreign policy.  
What was at stake, according to Alexei G. Arbatov, was the pre-eminence of law over 
arbitrary use of force. The outcome would eventually “determine whether Russia and 
NATO have either a cooperative or confrontational relationship at the level of 
maintaining both regional and global security” (Arbatov in Smith 1999:10-11). 
Furthermore, “Western employment of large-scale forces in the Balkans lifted the 
taboo against the use of military force as an instrument for resolving ethnic problems 
                                              
11 Start III, CTBT and the Open Skies Treaty were postponed and cancelled but ratified shortly after (Arbatov 2000:26-28).  
12 The UN Security Council had during 1998 and 1999 agreed in four resolutions the peaceful settlement of the escalating 
humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. Finally the UN applied Chapter VII and determined that there was a threat to international 
peace and security but urged for a political solution through dialogue.  
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and conflicts that had been in place since the end of the first Chechen war” (Arbatov 
2000:2). The Kosovo intervention strengthened Russia’s perception of NATO as an 
immediate threat to national security, and brought Russia’s political ambitions closer 
to the European Union. All in all, Russia was left in political isolation primarily 
because the USA once again looked upon Russia as the ‘problem’ more than as a 
partner in international cooperation.    
Russia’s international orientation may, thus far, be summed up in three broad periods 
of time. From 1991 to 1993, President Yeltsin did his utmost to please the West, but 
insisted secondly on the country’s great power tradition even if it jeopardized 
international good will. And third, from 2001 and onwards, President Putin actively 
engaged with the West both politically and economically, and even partnered with the 
US led War against Terrorism.   
Kokoshin (2002) argued that only the states that were “free to independently 
determine domestic, foreign and defence policies, enter into unions and leave them, 
form strategic partnerships or stay away from them” uphold real sovereignty. 
Interpreting his view literally might not include any national government in the 21st 
century although most countries certainly claim sovereignty. But a broader 
understanding of the quote allows for a nuanced analysis. At the core of this thesis 
question is the discussion of whether Russian President Putin was independently 
engaging in strategic cooperation with the West or motivated by the vulnerabilities 
and opportunities in the wake of NATO’s military supremacy, secessionist uprising, 
and of economic collapse. This current thesis argues that Russia, at the end of the 
1990s, could not manoeuvre with full sovereignty in international relations. This was 
because a growing foreign debt and apparent isolation from high political decision 
making had made negative impacts on Russian foreign polices. 
Up until he was appointed Prime Minister in August 1999, Vladimir Vladimirovich 
Putin was an unknown national political figure. And only four months later was he 
placed at the top of Russian politics and was nominated president. On 26 March 
2000, Putin won the presidential elections with over 52 percent of the votes in the 
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first round. This rapid event helped Putin create a public image as a young and 
outstanding administrator in Russian political history. Media outlets described him as 
different from all previous Russian presidents, because he knew how to achieve his 
clear political goals. He was the “man who could get things done” (Herspring 
2005:2). His areas of focus were a stronger state, the condemnation of oligarchs’ 
political influence, and attempts to gain access to Western policy makers. The 
Western powers, furthermore, perceived Putin as a ‘normal’ state leader “with whom 
the West could ‘do business’”13 (Lo 2003:1).  
President Putin was an outspoken pragmatist and affiliated with no particular 
ideology. According to Fedorov’s typology, pragmatism was based on the premise 
that affluent democracies of the world were positioning themselves with the most 
advanced forms of economic and military power (Fedorov 2006:3). In this view, if 
Russia was to avoid being forced to the periphery of international relations, it would 
have to associate with the community of democracies. Putin’s school of thought, 
then, presumed the threats to the Russian Federation to be identical to those threats 
undermining the West; namely domestic instabilities, proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, terrorism, and a set of soft threats (ibid., Putin 1999:210). President 
Putin was particularly committed to bureaucratic efficiency and to the tightening of 
the vertical power structure or a “dictatorship of law” (Putin 2000:7) as he called it. 
Putin somewhat confirmed a Russian tradition of political absolutism. For this reason, 
it is possible to analyze Russia’s international orientation as the sole work of 
President Putin.  
During Putin’s first period in office, Russian relations with NATO and the EU were 
strengthened. The NATO – Russia Council was established in 2002 in Rome and has 
since formally institutionalized increasing strategic cooperation between the two. The 
forms of cooperation have included support in the war against international terrorism, 
crises resolutions, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and cooperation 
                                              
13 This was originally Margaret Thatcher’s description of Gorbachev, but it has been applied to Putin on several occasions.    
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in civil emergencies (Voronin 2005). It is, above all, the practical level of the 
partnership that stands out (ibid.). Russian dialogue with the EU included facilitation 
for the modernization and integration of the Russian economy, conflict resolution, 
and non-proliferation (European Commission 2007). The structure of this relationship 
is based on the 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) which has above 
all led to heavy trade relations. The Russian economic growth and increased export of 
raw materials to the EU has resulted in a highly asymmetrical economic relationship, 
upon which Russia has grown increasingly dependent.  
While Russia improved her position relative to NATO and the EU, the domestic 
situation was continually difficult. President Putin’s main tool against internal threats 
to national security was the construction of a strong state. As mentioned above, 
Chechen secessionism had particularly in the second war become militarily 
radicalized and terrorist. The Russian population had become civilian target of many 
terrorist acts. The most widely known tragedies were the hostage taking in 2002 at 
the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow, the suicide attack in 2003 at an open-air concert 
also in Moscow, and the hostage taking in 2004 at the School Number One in Beslan 
in North Ossetia that killed more than 300 pupils and teachers. Terrorism had 
unfortunately been part of every day life in Russia and especially for Muscovites. 
And since the first war in Chechnya in 1994, terrorism was part of Russia’ Criminal 
Code (Stepanova 2005:303). 
In sum, this outline of pivotal moments has shown that the Russian Federation 
experienced dire political and economic crises at the end of its first decade as an 
independent country. The post-Soviet legacy, President Yeltsin’s economic 
mismanagement, and political secessionism had weakened Russia's status 
internationally. Hence, when NATO in 1999 decided to ignore Russian interests in 
Kosovo then President Putin had to make a strategic choice. His reforms included 
bureaucratic efficiency, pragmatic management of politics, and a cooperative 
international profile.   
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3. Theoretical Perspectives  
3.1 Introduction  
During the Cold War, a global balance of power shaped international security and 
established in security studies the theory of military deterrence. In international 
relations, the end of the Cold War was the most momentous event since the Second 
World War. Security studies went from being a distinct sub-field to emerging into the 
mainstream of international politics. As a result, most theoretical assumptions in 
security studies were dismissed globally as irrelevant in predicting the international 
distribution of power. Military power had suddenly become just one of many. There 
is substantial agreement in academic literature that the system structure of 
international security constellation is no longer bipolar. However, consensus has been 
weak on a description of the post-bipolar system. In post-Soviet Russia, the scholars 
who used to study international security through the lenses of realpolitik and zero 
sum games had to fill the post-Marxist theoretical vacuum (Sergounin 2004:19) and 
invent new analytical devices to cope with new conceptual and practical challenges 
caused by transition to market economy and democracy and new rule of international 
norms. 
The theoretical foundation of this current thesis will draw on assumptions in 
international security after the end of the Cold War. Regional Security Complex 
Theory (RSCT) offers an intricate theoretical framework beyond a type of polarity 
that is merely based in material power, military procurements and capabilities. 
Instead, the RSCT proposes a holistic conceptualization of the global distribution of 
power and power potential. Applied to this thesis question, the RSCT helps to 
identify and assess the interactions and dynamics that shape Russia’s securitization of 
vulnerabilities and opportunities in foreign affairs.  
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3.2 The Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) 
Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver established a framework for international security 
analyses that emphasized relative autonomy of the regional level in a strong 
international system. ‘Strong international system’ refers here to the characteristics of 
globalization, e.g. intensified interaction capacities in communication, a new sense of 
time and space, and the increasing imposition of the systemic on the local (Buzan and 
Wæver 2003:24-25). Adding a regional level of analysis to studies of non-bipolar 
security structures allowed for a theoretical combination of neo-realism and 
constructivism. 
Theoretically, the Regional Security Complex Theory is complimentary to Neo-
Realism, because of a shared emphasis on the power structure and the territorial 
dimension of international security. RSCT agrees with Neo-Realism on the 
description of a system structure but argues contrarily that the most appropriate level 
of analysis is not the global level but a regional. The regional level is crucial for 
global powers because it forms the options for and consequences of global powers’ 
projection of influences (Buzan and Wæver 2003:47) and because Russia is 
considered a great power, the regional and the global levels merge. Therefore the 
appropriate level to study interaction between global powers is henceforth the global 
level. The global level of security is, according to RSCT, made up by one superpower 
(the USA) plus four great powers (Britain/France/Germany-EU, Japan, China and 
Russia). This one-plus-four system characterizes the global level of polarity and the 
line between this level of global powers and the next “defines the difference between 
global and regional security dynamics” (ibid.:34). Analytically, the Baltic States 
draws the line of separation between the two European RSCs; the EU-Europe and its 
‘near abroad’, and the post-Soviet space. In the 2003 edition of RSCT it remains a 
theoretical possibility that these two European RSCs are not yet sufficiently involved 
in each others security issues to turn Europe into one single analytical domain. 
However, the 2004 accession of the Baltic States into the EU is moving the political 
borders but not necessarily the borders related to security issues. Except for the EU-
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Europe complex, which does not distinguish between local, regional and global 
levels, RSCs do not have actor qualities but serve only analytical purposes. This 
current thesis aims to discuss security dynamics between global powers and is 
therefore preoccupied mostly on the global level of analysis.   
When studying global security interactions, it becomes apparent that the global level 
is a function of regions that are composed of geographically clustered sets of state 
units theoretically labelled Regional Security Complexes (RSCs). In definition, such 
a Regional Security Complex, or an RSC, is “a set of units whose major processes of 
securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems 
cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan and 
Wæver 2003:44). Other things being equal, an RSC is therefore a group of states that 
possess sufficient security interdependence to both link the states together and to 
differentiate them from other clusters (ibid.:47-48). At the core of this perspective is 
the idea that processes of securitization and desecuritization in the international 
system will manifest themselves in regional clusters. Finally, the RSCT argues that 
all security interactions are dependent on the social construction of dynamics at the 
regional level and is therefore fundamentally a constructivist theorem.  
RSCT builds on the strengths from constructivism under the assumption that state 
identity is a dependent variable that is determined by the historical, cultural, social 
and political context (Lomagin 2005:257).  Security is accordingly a dynamic 
condition that is closely tied to the political processes of states. An issue can be 
defined as being a security relevant problem by the act of securitization. Reasons for 
making something a security issue are inter-subjective and socially constructed 
(Buzan et al. 1998:31). When an issue is termed a security problem then the political 
process of moving this particular issue beyond normal politics is the act of 
securitization. Securitization is thus the more extreme version of politicization. The 
securitized issues develop and arise largely from discursive practices within the state 
and secondarily between states (Lipschutz 1995:9). It is therefore an act of speech 
between the state administration and both the domestic and the international public. 
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The result may be a security policy that encompasses both the security problem in 
addition to some measures taken in response. Dynamics of securitization are 
continually reshaping RSCs. The “formation and operation of the RSCs hinge on 
patterns of amity and enmity among the units in the system, which makes regional 
systems dependent on the actions and interpretations of actors, not just the 
distribution of power” (Buzan and Wæver 2003:40). Security policies are the result of 
interpretations of threat in a complex web of interaction.  
Security policies aim to defend values that are considered crucial for survival, and 
comprise much more than the mere defence against potential military threats against 
the state or the military defence of such values. Measures of national security, or 
security policies, have been associated with military capabilities but increasingly also 
with vital issues related to the economy, ideology and with the access to natural 
resources. According to Kjølberg and Jeppesen, there might be two reasons for this 
broadening of the security concept. New issues were added into the security concept 
either because they had indirectly downgraded military capabilities or affected the 
military’s intentions to use force. Or, the added aspects have been directly security 
related as political, ideological and economic essential values that are considered 
fundamental to any state, nation or society. Issues that political realists previously 
used to portray as objective and tangible concerns were by the proponents of this 
approach defined as security relevant only when they were perceived as threatening 
or disturbingly ambiguous (Kjølberg and Jeppesen 2001:18). Hence, it has become 
less interesting whether threats are imagined, simulated, or tangible because “their 
ultimate consequences are all too real” (Lipschutz 1995:8). Threats are above all 
based in perceptions or interpretations, and cannot for that reason be measured in 
terms of the phenomenon’s objective existence (Kjølberg and Jeppesen 2001:18). 
This is why a security concept must be extended to analytically account for much 
more than the mere level of material power and strategic capabilities.  
The very act of securitization, therefore, is the act of labelling something a security 
issue. By doing so, the securitizing actor claims a right to use extraordinary means or 
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break normal rules. “Since a question of survival necessarily involves a point of no 
return at which it will be too late to act, it is not defensible to leave this issue to 
normal politics”. The securitization of any referent objects within the close vicinity of 
one RSC is of security concerns to any of the other RSCs. The analytical question is 
not whether or not the issue in itself is a threat per se, but “when and under what 
conditions who securitises what issue”. It is in this political process of the 
securitization; i.e. labelling something a threat, that distinct security dynamics 
originate” (Buzan and Wæver 2003:71). In sum, political threats relate to the give or 
deny of recognition and legitimacy (Buzan et al. 1998:142). Therefore, the degree of 
political attention uttered in words and diplomatic acts serves as a measure of the 
current threat picture. Language theory may explain security as an act of speech 
because an issue becomes a security problem only when the state elite declares it as 
such. “By uttering ‘security’, a state representative moves a particular development 
into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are 
necessary to block it” (Wæaver 1995:55). Securitization is therefore the political 
process of gaining popular acceptance for moving a case out of regular procedures 
and into a practice of priority based on the weight of the argument.  
RSCT helps understand the nature of President Putin acts of securitization as they are 
communicated in the selected text material. This thesis the will examine the dynamics 
of securitization and not be limited to the issues that have been successfully 
securitized. In order to understand what issues have been attempted securitized in the 
Russian public debate this thesis will analyse several official documents and 
statements but will not deal with the public response to these securitization attempts. 
This study will focus on how the relationship with NATO and the EU has been 
presented in official statements and not so much on the public reading of this 
relationship.      
Applied RSCT 
The main variables of the RSCT, by which an RSC is described, are territorial 
boundary (e.g. geographical proximity), anarchic structure, polarity, and social 
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construction (e.g. relations of enmity and amity). “Anarchy plus the distance effect 
plus geographical diversity yields a pattern of regionally based clusters, where 
security interdependence is markedly more intense between the states inside such 
complexes than between states inside the complex, and those outside it” (Buzan and 
Wæver 2003:46). RSCs are the results of power systems to counterbalance anarchic 
structures, and of pressures from geographical proximity (ibid.:45). The 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) illustrates such alliance building in 
counterweight to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Of course, geographical 
proximity tends to generate more security interaction between neighbours since 
conflict travels more easily over shorter distances. The impact of geographical 
distance on security, however, is strongest in military and political sectors and less 
significant in the economic sector (Buzan et al. 1998). This matrix of interactions 
makes up a security constellation of four levels of interactions.   
RSCT describes the dynamics of securitization within and between RSCs in four 
levels of analysis, which corresponds to levels of interaction that are simultaneously 
at play. The domestic level studies the internally generated vulnerabilities within the 
state. This could be done by asking questions of state stability and of what security 
fears the state bears. The second level, the inter-state, is important because it 
established the RSC as such, but this level has less variation and is consequently of 
less interest to this particular study. The third level, regional interaction between 
RSCs, should be analyzed parallel to the fourth level, the interplay among the 
security actors on the global level. These four levels of interaction and analysis 
constitute the “security constellation” (Buzan and Wæver 2003:51).  
Whether or not a specific RSC is centred or standard is not fixed in theory but 
through empirical studies. Empirically, the post-Soviet RSC upholds a unipolar 
structure centred on the great power of the Russian Federation. This particular 
complex has been structured by long-term patterns of growth and contraction in the 
Russian Empire, and by the region’s varying attachment to other regions, primarily 
Europe (Buzan and Wæver 2003:397). The post-Soviet RSC and the EU-Europe RSC 
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convey different agendas of values and interests. RSCT deals with the interplay 
between types of states (e.g. modernist and internally more cohesive, versus post-
modernist states with less focus on empirical sovereignty), and security dynamics 
between weak and strong states. Strong states in this context refer to the “degree of 
socio-political cohesion between civil society and the institutions of government” 
(ibid.:22). Russia is a strong and modernist state, which represents the classical 
Westphalian type of state. These states are defined by strict government control and 
restrictive attitudes towards openness in society. Modernist states, such as Russia, 
“see themselves as independent and self-reliant entities, having distinctive national 
cultures and development policies, and often pursuing mercantilist economic policies. 
Their borders mark real lines of closure against outside economic, political, and 
cultural influences, and their sovereignty is sacrosanct” (ibid.:22-23). The modernist 
state upholds a securitization of the traditional agenda of threats such as state 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic productivity. The USA is also 
considered a modernist state because of its high level of conflict formation on the 
global level. 
The Western European countries are also strong states but have moved away from the 
Westphalian characteristics. They correspond to a post-modernist type of state and 
are found mainly among the capitalist economic powers. Post-modernist states are not 
driven by traditional military concerns about armed invasions but define instead the 
world’s economic centre. All in all, they strongly project the values of openness into 
the international system (Buzan and Wæver 2003:23-24). The EU-Europe RSC is 
perceived as a security community, in which the members cannot even imagine 
resorting to violent ways of pursuing their goals, and a war between them is ruled out 
as a way of settling their disputes (Adler and Barnett 1998). As opposed to the post-
Soviet RSC, this is a desecuritized region albeit not entirely. Actually, the integration 
process is in part the securitization of the fear of a return a fragmented Europe of the 
past (Buzan and Wæver 2003:57).   
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All types of states have their security agendas shaped by the regional and 
international context. The states are furthermore conditioned by the essential structure 
of regional dynamics in which they find themselves, and are therefore affected by the 
international security environment in different ways. Hence, all states operate in the 
global system of security but the main variables predispose states to interact 
differently. Security interactions on the regional level are durable and self-contained 
so that socially constructed patterns of enmity and amity would exist regardless of 
interference form the global level. This is to say that global dominance on the 
regional level may support, but not entirely generate regional security interactions 
(Buzan and Wæver 2003:47). The link between the global level and the regional level 
dynamics is one of penetration. Penetration is when an external actor engages in a 
security alliance within another RSC. This may result in regional rivalry and may be 
motivated by agreement or disagreement on the global level. The US bases in 
Uzbekistan for military and humanitarian intervention in Afghanistan may serve as an 
example, although Russia respected the alignment and did not officially call this 
superpower penetration. Processes of globalisation thus represent two apparently 
contradictory trends, namely exclusion and inclusion (ibid.:25). Modernist states 
situated along the borders of post-modernist states often face particular dilemmas in 
the border areas that may end up as split societies. Exclusion often means the denial 
of the benefits of membership. The threat of inclusion, on the other hand, 
demonstrates the predicament of regime and cultural preservation versus foreign 
influence. Inside Russia this tension comes into play in the ideological discourse 
between the Westernizers and the Eurasianists (Neumann in Buzan and Wæver 
2003:25). The price for enjoying economic and political relations with the post-
modernist affluent countries is the demand for democracy and respect for human 
rights. Modernist states may perceive such foreign prerequisites as an assault on both 
their sovereignty and state identity.      
Post-Cold War security is a complex security constellation because it exhibits an 
infinite number of interactions. Additionally, the security concept is itself subject to 
renewal. Some may argue that in the future all securitizing dynamics will be 
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concentrated in specified sectors of either military or economy, but RSCT calls for a 
synthesis. A “securitisation of an economic threat will tend either to push down a 
competing military threat construction or to link to it and draw energy from the same 
threat appearing in several sectors” (Buzan and Wæver 2003:76). This captures more 
of the complexity with which real world interaction operates. For example, Russia 
has problems with demographic decline, with political secessionism, as well as with 
economic disadvantages. All in all, the analytical interest lies in the possibility of 
identifying the securitization of certain issues and determining the context in which 
they are located.         
What then is economic security compared to military-political security? Economic 
security is a much more blurry conception than military security, for example, but 
more tangible than political security. As opposed to military deterrence theory, the 
international economic system is characterised as a non-zero-sum game. The 
international economy is an interdependent game, in which one state’s economic 
growth does not necessarily inflict decline upon the rest. Economic security is 
therefore not so much based on historical enmity – amity relations as it is part of a 
recent and relatively open competition. According to the RSCT, economic security is 
based on mechanisms of two systems that both are anarchic in nature. These are the 
mechanisms in the international political system, on the one hand, and those that 
operate in the international market economy, on the other. The West’s victory in the 
Cold War marginalized but did not eliminate the economic nationalist element. 
Liberalism is the dominant mechanism in the international economy with one result 
being interdependence within the capitalistic system and increased competition 
between countries. Advocates of liberalism opposed the state’s interference with 
economic forces because their main objective was to create product and factor 
mobility among national economies, such as the international movement of labour, 
capital and production. The consequences of increased integration in production, 
trade and finance have made national economies in the low end more vulnerable to 
global fluctuations. Economic instability created conditions of exploitation of oil 
dependency, and the highly discriminating trade supply of raw materials from the 
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third world. This was of great concern to Russia because the effects were 
deindustrialization which posed a threat to both welfare and sovereignty (Buzan et al. 
1998:97). The economically weak Russia grew dependent on Western markets, which 
was obviously a disadvantage, and became a losing player in the international 
political economy. Hence, Russia securitized all aspects of territorial and economic 
security that were significant to its power in international relations.    
3.3 Main Features of the Post-Soviet RSC 
The concept of Great Power 
The concept of great power status stands out in Russian security policy “as a unifying 
formula for the conduct of affairs” (Neumann 2005:13). Great power status is an 
expression based in part on Russia’s uniqueness and capabilities on the international 
arena and in part on the consolidating mechanisms in her culture and geopolitics. 
According to RSCT, great power status differs from regional power qualities because 
other actors respond to them about the present and near-future distribution of power. 
A “great power is treated in the calculations of other major powers as if it has the 
clear economic, military, and political potential to bid for superpower status in the 
short or medium term” (Buzan and Wæver 2003:35). Russia qualifies for great power 
status because of her recent exit from superpower status. It is the presupposition of 
this current thesis that Russia was on the brink of losing great power qualities in the 
late 1990s due to the deep economic, military, and political crises. In this period, 
Russia struggled with being internationally recognized as an irreplaceable partner in 
world affairs. The key problem of Russia’s self-appointment was that only the 
communities with particular interests really cared what Russia did (Neumann 
2005:15). And it would be impossible for a large state to be a great power if it were 
ignored by the international community. “In order to be great you need the 
recognition of others, and in order to be recognized you need to be noticed and 
thought of on a regular basis” (ibid.). To be a great power was accordingly to be 
present when absent and to have a droit de regard. It was, however, Russia’s 
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enormous economic potential that turned this vulnerable situation into one of 
opportunity and made the two dominating powers, Europe and the USA, more 
dependent on Russia.  
This being said, Western geo-economics and geo-politics have inspired President 
Putin in his strategy of turning the Russian Federation into a normal great power. 
Whereas Kozyrev pursued an integrationist policy and Primakov his policy of great 
power balancing against the USA, the pragmatic President Putin advocated strategies 
of great power normalization. In other words, he pursued the objectives of moving 
away from Soviet style isolationism and sought to turn Russia into a fully fledged 
member of the international community. “Instead of capitalizing on the threat posed 
by unipolarity […] Putin drew attention to the world’s instabilities, such as terrorism, 
as well as some new economic opportunities” (Tsygankov 2005:133). Falling behind 
in economic development and terrorism were in effect the key threats for Putin, not 
the one emanating from the USA (ibid.:133-138). The label ‘normal’ in this context 
refers without exception to Russia’s renewed focus on economic liberalism. Lo and 
Trenin draw due attention to the usage of this label and argue that this ‘normality’ 
does not imply subscribing to Western norms and ideals (Trenin and Lo 2005:8). 
Rather, being a normal great power means to accept and behave by the rules of 
engagement in the pursuit of concrete goals. Russia as a great power means that the 
possibility of cooperation exists and that there is nothing in this process that 
“suggests that we should consider Russian foreign policy as anything other than a 
‘normal’ subject” (ibid.). Great power normalization concords with Russia’s 
traditional strategic thinking with emphasis on positioning Russia as a great power, 
but the normalization process disagrees on the means applied.  
Polarity, Social Construction and Boundary 
As mentioned above, the power structure in the post-Soviet RSC is one of unipolarity 
centred on the Russian great power. The social construction within this RSC is 
shaped by fear and the use of violence, by imperial expansion and by the region’s 
involvement with particularly Europe. The relations of enmity identify this RSC and 
 39
it is therefore a conflict formation (Buzan and Wæver 2003:397-398). The 
preservation of expansionism and outward domination has been possible because 
among other Russian imperial history never developed ethnic identity at the base of 
its state building. Instead, the absence of a political concept of nation has in various 
ways defined Russia. Russian identity is often associated with the concept of state, 
not nation (Tolz 2003, Buzan and Wæver 2003:407, Teague 2005). It is important to 
acknowledge, in regards to an expansive and mighty Russia, that ‘Russianness’ is 
neither confined to territorial borders nor to an ethnic Russian population. Ethnic 
Russians is by far the most numerous minority group and, due to Russian patronage, 
politically also the most powerful diaspora group in the entire post-Soviet space 
(Kolstø 1999:122). And within this RSC, relations of enmity between the Russian 
administration and Caucasian secessionism are clearly considered a threat to national 
security.  
This type of social construction was in 1993 formally institutionalized in the Russian 
policies claiming a particular sphere of interest in what they referred to as their Near 
Abroad, i.e. the former Soviet Republics (Buzan and Wæver 2003:404). The 
intention was to both secure Russian minorities abroad and to protect economic 
interests (ibid.:405). This policy justified heavy military, political and economic 
involvement in conflicts in Russia’s immediate proximity, such as in the Georgian-
Abkhazian, the Georgian-Ossetian, and in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts in 
Southern Caucasus. Keeping control in ones own backyard is implicitly understood 
as indispensable if Russia is to exert influence on the international level (ibid.:408-
410). Despite deep conflict formation, this RSC is still considered one durable 
geographical cluster of interdependent securitization dynamics. The post-Soviet RSC 
is formally based on the organization of the CIS, the Russian political domination and 
manipulation, and the beginnings of a counter alliance between the Western oriented 
states of Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUUAM14) 
                                              
14 After the withdrawal in 2005 of Uzbekistan from this organization, the formal name has been GUAM.    
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(ibid.:429). Altogether, these dynamics that were based primarily in relations of 
enmity, but also in potentially expanding and contracting boundaries, make up the 
post-Soviet great power complex. According to RSCT, these security relations are 
part of Russia’s agenda on the global level. Russia’s abilities to project influence on 
the regional level gives her clout among global powers. Therefore, Russia’s main 
level of interaction is the global between the post-Soviet RSC and the EU-Europe 
RSC (ibid.:429) but is closely interlinked with regional dynamics. 
Interactions on the Global Level  
According to RSCT, the dynamics of great power RSCs may be difficult and 
misleading to differentiate from those on the global level for two reasons. First, the 
dynamics within great power RSC directly affect assumptions on the balance of 
power in the international system. Second, great power interaction on the global level 
may spill over and intensify dynamics on the regional level. In essence great power 
RSCs operate on two levels of interactions and may be described as hybrids of both 
the global and the regional level (Buzan and Wæver 2003:59). For Russia, the global 
level of interaction is most important because this is where great power privileges and 
prospects are mediated. It is on the global level in the one-plus-four system that 
Russia may secure her permanent status in the UN Security Council (ibid.:433), 
advocate a multipolar world, warn against illegitimate use of force, and engage in 
economic cooperation. Russian great power ambitions cannot be underestimated, but 
again this alone could not explain why Russia chose the West.  
Three theoretical variables that define main national interests are firmly set in the 
above RSCT perspective which will conduct the main discussion in the following 
chapter. RSCT provides for an understanding of these two sets of territorial issues 
and one set of economic and non-territorial issues. Russian great power ambitions 
have caused the securitization of particular national interests as follows. Firstly, 
regional vulnerabilities have directed Russian interaction on the global level in terms 
of protecting state sovereignty and territorial integrity. The securitization of these 
national interests caused, among other, overt reactions to NATO expansion.  EU and 
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NATO expansions of membership have efficiently brought Western Europe to the 
doorstep of Russia’s federal borders. The NATO inclusion of former Soviet states 
took place so rapidly that some argued it was removing space but not suspicion 
(Strauss 2001). The NATO expansion is a dilemma of trust when confronted with 
Russian national interests (Kydd 2001:802). The inclusion in 2004 of the Baltic 
States into the EU, gave the Russian scepticism a key position in deciding on 
Russia’s future of cooperation with both the EU and NATO. Secondly, international 
opportunities have encouraged Russia to demand a multipolar security constellation. 
This securitization move contained primarily a critique against the USA but 
encompassed next an alignment with other states including the USA in the fight 
against terrorism. After 11 September 2001, new great power political constellations 
fostered an alliance building across the East-West divide. The terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001 gave the Russian administration an opportunity to be ‘rediscovered’ 
as a provider of stability in international security. Lastly, non-territorial 
vulnerabilities convey the securitization of national interests in economic power, 
which are particularly pertinent in the dialogue with the EU. Such economic issues 
are, for example, financial independence, economic disadvantages and integration. 
The new Russian Federation set out to transfer its communist regime of planned 
economy, social welfare and nuclear deterrence to one of marked economy, rule of 
law and genuine respect for human rights. Russian economic interests managed to 
achieve in the PCA and the Common Strategy some advancement in favour of a free 
trade area between EU and Russia. Developing relations with the EU were important 
dynamics in Russian securitization because it enfolded practical and valuable 
experience in inter-institutional cooperation, for one, but also because it connected 
Russia to the European trade markets.        
This chapter has presented the theoretical perspectives. The RSCT is the appropriate 
theory because it describes and interlinks important dynamics of securitization on the 
regional and the global level. Particularly two aspects of the extended security 
concept pertain to this thesis, and these are Russia’s securitization of territorial 
security and economic security. These two aspects in particular convey the most 
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delicate vulnerabilities and opportunities in Putin’s quest to restore Russia’s great 
power status. And finally, they validated the three variables; the securitization of state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, multipolarity and alignment, and economic 
vulnerabilities. The global level of analysis is important because this is where the 
reclaim of great power capabilities and status must take place. According to President 
Putin, Russia is and should be the provider of security in the post-Soviet region and a 
sine-qua-non in security constellations. 
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4. Discussion of Text Material 
The interests of the state lie in the inviolability of the constitutional system and of Russia’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity; in political, economic and social stability; in unconditional assurance of lawfulness and 
maintenance of law and order; and in the development of international cooperation on equal terms and to 
mutual benefit (NSC 2000:2).  
4.1 Introduction   
In his speech, “Russia at the Turn of the Millennium” (1999), President Putin 
delivered a sober recount of Russia’s possibilities and challenges in the era of 
globalization. Russia was taking part in the new type of societies developing post-
industrial characteristics. This implied that more importance had to be directed to the 
secondary and the tertiary sectors. In 1999, this speech referred to globalization in 
terms of both hope and fear (Putin 1999:210). The rapid advancement of only a few 
countries was perceived as a threat to Russian industrial production and economic 
progress. On the path along international technological evolution, the modernization 
process in Russia was hampered by severe economic difficulties, such as low GDP, 
old equipment, and little capital investment and national spending on research and 
technological development.  In all, the Soviet legacy had taken its toll on Russian 
ambitions. President Putin therefore urged the Russian public and businesses to learn 
from the Soviet failures. “Russia has reached its limit for political and socio-
economic upheavals, cataclysms, and radical reforms” (Putin 1999:212), he asserted. 
Russia simply could not bear anymore political turmoil if the country was to retain its 
rightful place among the world’s great powers. To divert away from a blind pursuit of 
Western text book recipes, Putin made a further appeal for a Russian specific model 
of economic restructuring. Russia had to undergo considerable changes and do so 
rapidly.  
The Russian Federation securitized all political, military and economic disadvantages 
that the country experienced at the turn of the millennium: 
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The condition of the national economy and incomplete nature of the system and structure of 
the authorities of state and of society, social and political polarization of society and 
criminalization of social relations, the growth of organized crime and terrorism, and a 
deterioration in intercommunal and international relations are all creating a broad range of 
internal and external threats to the country’s security (NSC 2000:3). 
The ensuing discussion will now put Russia’s explicit discourse on state sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, multipolarity and terrorism, and economic weakness and 
integration under particular scrutiny. The academic purpose is to examine 
securitization dynamics that may have led to Russia's strategic cooperation with the 
West.    
4.2 Russia’s Political Position 
Russia’s position as a great power was ubiquitously mentioned in all strategy 
documents, and the explicit reference was outstanding in volume as well as in 
significance. It seemed to be the essential driving force of both the Russian elite and 
of the people. The connotation evoked national pride and bore with it a sense of 
cultural uniqueness. Preserving Russian state sovereignty and territorial integrity at 
the core of the regional unipolar power structure was imperative for the regime’s 
existence. Above all, the political goals were to stave off secession and terrorism 
from around the Federation’s borders and to preserve strategic stability within those 
borders.  
I Vulnerabilities: State Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity 
One of Putin’s main reasons for giving top priority to great power status had to do 
with state identity. Presumably a strong state was a source of order and the primary 
driving force for any change (Putin 1999:214). Any other choice but the one “to 
develop relying on our distinctive [Russian] character, and own efforts” (Putin 
2000:1) was for the weak, and thus not amendable to a strong and self-confident 
Russia. His interpretation of a historically coinciding pattern of political instability 
furthermore defined and threatened Russia’s political development and state building. 
“All of the periods during which Russia has been weakened, whether politically or 
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economically, have always and inexorably brought to the fore the threat of the 
country’s collapse” (Putin 2003:1). Moreover, a strong state could moreover reduce 
the risk of bureaucratic and constitutional disruption and thus preserve sovereignty. 
Domestic preservation of state sovereignty and territorial integrity meant avoiding 
any attempts to violently overthrow the constitutional order, and prevent any 
organized illegal activities aimed at destabilizing the political situation (MD 2000:4). 
Consequently, a strong state called for bureaucratic efficiency. Bureaucratic 
incompetence had made the country politically, economically and militarily 
vulnerable. This was a deliberate critique of the former President Yeltsin’s economic 
and public management. Upon taking power, President Putin was set on bureaucratic 
reform. The first Annual Address focused particularly on reforms of state 
bureaucracy wherein he insisted on “the dictatorship of Law” (Putin 2000:7). He 
argued that the structure of the Russian state needed to change but that any state 
reform must henceforth neither jeopardize bureaucratic efficiency nor impede on 
political authority. He insisted on restructuring the system of state authorities, which 
was incomplete and had thus far only created “a broad range of internal and external 
threats to the country’s national security” (NSC 2000:3). New federal districts were 
subsequently set up to “increase the effectiveness of state policies, stabilize 
international relations, and bring more clarity to the organization of Russian power” 
(Putin 2002:5). Bureaucratic efficiency and a tighter vertical power structure were the 
means to amass political strength and ensure Russia’s regional dominance. According 
to Bobo Lo (2005:1), this renewal of Russian authoritarianism under Putin translated 
seamlessly into an aggressive foreign policy.     
With regard to Russia’s international strength relative to other world powers, Putin 
eloquently sketched out Russia’s great power status. He aspired to become an “equal 
in the community of the most developed nations” (Putin 2003:1) and sought to 
“strengthen Russia’s place in the world” (Putin 2004:1). He also pointed to Russia’s 
expected high rank as the “recognised place” as though it was predestined (Putin 
2003:1). The President also conveyed a fear in the international community to deal 
with a confident Russia. Building an “independent, strong and self-reliant Russia” 
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was a “competitive battle” (Putin 2004:2) that could, if the political elite failed, end 
up in political isolation. This was because the remnants from the previous East-West 
divide still fed Russian scepticism in the world. And the efforts to strengthen the 
Russian state were sometimes deliberatively interpreted as authoritarianism (Putin 
2004:2). Despite the likelihood of being misinterpreted, “there will be no going back 
on the fundamental principles of our politics. Commitment to democratic values is 
dictated by the will of our people and by the strategic interests of Russia itself” (Putin 
2004:2). A strong state depended accordingly on “ensuring a normal life for allour 
people” (ibid.). Therefore, Russia must stand up against the difficult consequences of 
the Cold War, which were “attempts to infringe on the sovereign rights of nations in 
the disguise of ‘humanitarian’ operations” (Putin 2000:3). The Russian 
administration was ill at ease and suffered from what they perceived was a Western 
secret agenda. This led to a concern about protecting Russian privileges vis-à-vis 
international diplomacy, such as the respect of Russia’s veto right in the UN Security 
Council. “Not only our authority on the international stage but also the political and 
economic situation in Russia itself depends on how competently and effectively we 
use our diplomatic possibilities” (Putin 2001:8). Because of Russian scepticism, the 
only way to circumvent Russia from exercising her veto would be to overrule the 
UNSC decision making monopoly and apply military force regardless. 
Russia’s self imposed responsibility to maintain security in the world stressed the 
support of non-proliferation regimes, in particular the 1972 ABM Treaty15; “the 
cornerstone of strategic stability” (FPC 2000:5). Along this vein, Russia encouraged 
the reduction of conventional armed forces, and regarded international peacekeeping 
as an effective instrument in conflict resolution. The Military Doctrine asserted that 
Russia preferred “political, diplomatic, and other non-military means of preventing 
[…] military threats at regional and global levels” (MD 2000:5). The alternative was 
                                              
15 The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, signed in 1972, was central in the US and Soviet arms reduction. The treaty was in 
force until 2002 when the USA decided to withdraw and has since promoted a system of National Missile Defence, which 
would have been illegal according to the ABM Treaty.    
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strategies of aggressive unilateral action that could provoke arms race and further 
aggravate interstate, national and religious strife.  
One of Russia’s main objectives in foreign policy was to form “a good-neighbor belt 
along the perimeter of Russia’s borders, to promote elimination of the existing and 
prevent the emergence of potential hotbeds of tension and conflicts in the region” 
(FPC 2000:2). The more colloquial language in the Annual Addresses allowed the 
President to be relatively personal and intimate about his nation’s main strengths and 
weaknesses. The conflict in Chechnya served as a domestic case of concern with 
infinite rhetorical potential. President Putin hailed the pro-Russian result of the 2003 
referendum in Chechnya “that marked the end of troubled times in Chechnya”. The 
President thanked the Chechen people “for their courage […] and for the wisdom that 
is so inherent in people who are simple and yet always so sensitive to the truth. 
People in Chechnya felt in their hearts their responsibility and [felt] where their 
human interest lies” (Putin 2003:3). In many ways, territorial integrity embodied the 
Chechen conflict. President Putin’s success of keeping the federation together has 
been measured in the outcome of secessionist claims in the south. At the beginning of 
his period, only thirty-five percent of the Russian population believed that Putin had 
made progress towards a settlement in Chechnya (White in Allison et al. 2006:43). 
However, a survey in the year 2005, found that sixty-five percent of Russians said 
Putin had successfully improved Russia’s international recognition (ibid.). The 
resolute military intervention may have offered him this high political status. 
Ironically, Putin’s military prowess in Chechnya became an admired trademark and 
increased his prominence in spite of the population’s outspoken scepticism against 
devastating warfare only a few years earlier. As such, the Chechen-Russian electoral 
victory in 2003 officially confirmed Russia’s territorial integrity but it had come at a 
significant price. And the straightforward presentation of Chechens who, before the 
referendum, used to be ‘medieval bandits’ but who had in the meantime become ‘law 
abiding’ was more rhetorically charming than analytically relevant.  
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Evidently, the future and development of Russia was dependent on the unity of the 
federation free from secessionist claims. Russia would be defenceless “if our society 
is splintered into little groups and if we all busy ourselves with the narrow interests of 
our particular group” (Putin 2003:2). The President was convinced that the conflict in 
Chechnya and the fight against terrorism ought to be Russia’s main reasoning for 
consolidating democracy and ensuring human rights (Putin 2004:8). The Russian 
administration expressed concerns about the growth of international terrorism and the 
illegal trafficking of weapons, which were beginning to exert significant influence on 
global and regional stability (FPC 2000:3) Offering military support in the fight 
against international terrorism was for Russia just as much a regional and domestic 
exercise as it was strategic in the face of western power consolidation.  
The preservation of territorial integrity was also important because Russian security 
was constantly under threat from NATO’s eastward expansion. “NATO’s transition 
to the practice of using military force outside its zone of responsibility and without 
UN Security Council sanction could destabilize the entire global strategic situation” 
(NSC 2000:5). The FPC warned against the manifested attempts to “belittle the role 
of a sovereign state as the fundamental element of international relations”, which has 
generated “a threat of arbitrary interference in internal affairs” (FPC 2000:3). Such 
provocations to existing regimes of international security that encouraged 
humanitarian interventions were interpreted as having destabilizing impacts on the 
Russian political and military situation (MD 2000:2). The global threat of direct 
military aggression had decreased, but other threats, such as secessionist territorial 
claims international interference in internal affairs, or opposition to Russia’s 
strengthening as an influential power had increased (MD 2000:3). The manner in 
which to reduce these threats was to maintain “strategic stability in the world through 
states’ compliance with their international obligations” and ensure favourable 
conditions for global and regional stability (NSC 2000:11). And, these threatening 
tendencies were furthermore aggravated by “the limited resource support for the 
foreign policy of the Russian Federation, making it difficult to uphold its foreign 
economic interests and narrowing down the framework of its information and cultural 
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influence abroad” (FPC 2000:3). However, in order to defend against the growing 
threat of external interference in domestic politics, Russian foreign policy should 
instead;  
influence general world processes with the aim of forming a stable, just and democratic 
world order, built on generally recognized norms of international law, including […] the 
goals and principles in the UN Charter, on equitable and partnership relations among states 
(FPC 2000:1).    
In response to the West’s disrespect of Russian interests over Kosovo, the Military 
Doctrine of 2000 articulated a level of deterrence. The document declared that 
Russia’s possession of nuclear weapons should be interpreted as “a factor in deterring 
aggression, safeguarding military security […] and maintaining international stability 
and peace” (MD 2000:5). The Russian political elite played the nuclear card and held 
it against US and NATO’s power dominance. This should, however, be understood as 
a move to preserve Russia’s existing privileges, particularly the country’s veto right 
in the UN Security Council.  
The entirety of section III in the FPC reviewed Russian priorities to collectively 
resolve global problems under UN jurisdiction. In international peacekeeping, 
“Russia proceeds from the premise that only the U.N. Security Council has the 
authority to sanction use of force” (FPC 2000:5). The blatant disregard for the 
international norm of non-intervention presented a substantial threat to Russian state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. This threat was manifested in “the desire of some 
states to diminish the role of existing mechanisms for ensuring international security, 
above all the United Nations and the OSCE” (NSC 2000:4-5). Hence, Russia 
considered any endorsements in violation of the UN Charter to be unlawful and 
destabilizing to all international relations. The illegitimate deployment of power 
should be collectively rejected and regional stability be protected. This was the lesson 
learned in 1999: “Attempts to introduce to the international parlance such concepts as 
‘humanitarian intervention’ and ‘limited sovereignty’ in order to justify unilateral 
power actions bypassing the U.N. Security Council are not acceptable” (FPC 2000:5). 
The Russian administration was impelled to strengthen the UN’s position in 
international decision making and peace keeping.      
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Consistent in these documents was an understanding of preserving state sovereignty 
and territorial integrity as the indispensable means to return Russia’s influence in the 
system of international decision making and peacekeeping. This latter mechanism 
should, however, always rest on a strengthened legal foundation in strict accordance 
with the UN Charter (FPC 2000:5) and the respect for non-intervention. The Russian 
foreign policy repeatedly warned against international military involvements in 
domestic problems. This was because the “use of power methods bypassing existing 
international legal mechanisms cannot remove the deep socio-economic, inter-ethnic 
and other contradictions that underlie conflicts” (FPC 2000:2). The President’s 
rationale for protecting state sovereignty and territorial integrity was rhetorically 
based in NATO’s illegitimate humanitarian interventions. But UN member states, on 
the other hand, had also started to scrutinize the principle of state sovereignty. This 
discourse was part of the global powers’ general reflections on a human security 
agenda after bipolarity and military deterrence. One of the solutions to ameliorate 
Russia’s vulnerabilities and the threat from loss of a sovereignty guarantee was to 
“ensure Russia’s cooperation, especially with the world’s leading countries, on 
equally and mutually advantageous terms” (NSC 2000:6). The strengthening of state 
regulations in Russia’s public domain was crucial for the implementation of Putin’s 
pragmatism. Russia pursued an independent foreign policy based on “consistency and 
predictability, on mutually advantageous pragmatism” (FPC 2000:3) and sought joint 
decision making in foreign affairs. Russian foreign policy followed a strict balance of 
objectives versus possibilities, because “the scope of participation in international 
affairs must be adequate to the actual contribution to strengthening the country’s 
positions” (FPC 2000:4). Enhanced cooperation with the world’s great powers was an 
important part of the state’s restoration project. 
Any official plea for the preservation of state sovereignty must be viewed in the 
context of the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo. From the Russian perspective, 
this was an assault on, and a move away from, the legally founded convention of non-
intervention and respect for national state sovereignty. The new emphasis on 
universal human rights posed a threat to Russia’s sovereignty along the lines of 
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“today Yugoslavia – tomorrow Russia”. Some politicians took extreme precautions 
after the 1999 NATO actions in Kosovo. The Russian elite and analysts were fearful 
that Russia could experience the same fate in Chechnya. One view advised Russia to 
“move from a policy of cooperation in a position of subordination to cooperation 
combined with simultaneous containment of NATO” (Lukin in Smith 1999:10). A 
Duma representative and NATO critic proposed to break off any ties with NATO and 
end Russian partaking in the Partnership for Peace-program; to support India instead 
of Germany in becoming full UN Security Council member; to strengthen military 
cooperation with the Islamic world, South East Asia and Latin America; and finally 
to build up Russian military power as a counter to NATO (ibid.). This explicit focus 
on state sovereignty and territorial integrity originated as an attempt to protect Russia 
against NATO’s task expansion, such as undertaking humanitarian interventions. 
Gradually, however, state sovereignty portrayed the need to resist domestic political 
upheavals and any attempts by external efforts of arbitrary interference in internal 
affairs.   
In sum, a focus on domestic vulnerabilities guided Putin’s decision to construct a 
strong state. He was determined to clean up after Yeltsin and argued that only a 
strong and efficient state could prevent the country from being socially fragmented 
and constitutionally disrupted. On the global level of interactions, the Russian 
political elite aspired to fend off the new extended issues in post-Cold War security 
such as the inclination towards humanitarian interventions. One could interpret this as 
part of an aggressive policy. Putin clearly stated that he was not intimidated and that 
Russia would not tolerate any reduction in the legitimate right to veto in the UN 
Security Council. If not aggressive, then the foreign policy was certainly an attempt 
to redirect or slow down the ongoing reorganisation of world power and to maintain 
focus on international law and respect of non-intervention. The anticipated reduction 
of unpredictability in world affairs seems to have motivated Putin’s foreign policy. 
Russia’s more or less direct disregard of international post-Cold War security 
policies, such as humanitarian interventions, should be interpreted as a warning signal 
to US / NATO unilateralism. Such forthright policies favoured global multipolarity 
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and have in turn become part of Russia’s rationale for cooperating more actively with 
European or pan-European institutions, e.g. the EU, the OSCE and some UN organs. 
In retrospect, Russia’s interpretations of respect for state sovereignty in the post-Cold 
War security architecture have resulted in a firm discourse on independence. A strong 
Russian state was crucial to its pursuit of a great power position. Likewise, territorial 
integrity has been a key part of reclaiming a great power status. The latter variable 
pertains to the vulnerabilities regarding strategic stability within the federation’s 
borders and along the southern perimeters.  
II Opportunities: Multipolarity and Alignment  
As a concept, multipolarity described the distribution of power in the international 
system and was during the 1990s the most prevalent principle in Russian foreign 
policy. It was particularly the change in Minsters of Foreign Affairs in 1996 (from 
Kozyrev to Primakov) that contributed to the shift in strategic thinking away from the 
ideology of Atlanticism and in favour of multipolarity. Although the Russian political 
elite did not completely avoid partnership with the West, Russia’s support of 
multipolarity carefully emphasized a greater commitment to states and centres other 
than the USA, such as Europe, China, and India among others (Webber and Smith 
2002:149). All three strategy documents, in addition to the account by the Minister of 
Defence in 2003, pointed to two main tendencies in the world. On the one hand, these 
were the struggle between the trends of unipolarity with the USA as superpower and, 
on the other, a structure with plural powers based in international law. The latter 
tendency stimulated a Russian foreign policy that was critical to US supremacy in 
foreign affairs and opposed to NATO enlargement. The sentiment was that US 
supremacy had left Russia with only a marginal role to play in important decision-
making. But was it necessarily so that a security constellation of unipolarity and a 
Russian influence on the global level were mutually exclusive?  
The following discussion will demonstrate that Russia’s political support and 
humanitarian relief in the war against terrorism signalled a shift away from this 
policy of multipolarity and with Russia playing a relatively prominent part this time. 
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With full acknowledgment that validity and measurement reliability may be put at 
risk, the following discussion of multipolarity and alignment in the war against 
international terrorism will overlap with the two previous sections and draw on both 
for relevance. It would however be unrealistic, counterproductive and impossible to 
split the discussion completely. While the former variable reflected on domestic 
vulnerabilities of political secessionism, the ensuing section will focus on the 
opportunities in the context of international terrorism. The interesting point will be to 
assess Russia’s interpretations of and proactive approach to shifting suppositions in 
international relations.  
Russia’s motivation to appreciate multipolarity at the top of world power 
constellations was wrapped in loose but captivating ‘diplomatic’ rhetoric. The 
common denominator was explicitly the fear of US unilateral use of power. For 
example, Russia designed foreign policy strategies in order to counter “the growing 
trend towards the establishment of a unipolar structure of the world with the 
economic and power domination by the United States” (FPC 2000:2). The efforts to 
discourage US unipolar power domination supported a multipolar world and were 
formally sustained in policies aiming to; 
build a system of partnership and allied relations that improve the conditions and 
parameters of international cooperation [and] to achieve a multi-polar system of 
international relations that really reflects the diversity of the modern world with its great 
variety of interests (FPC 2000:2).  
Overall, the manners in which the official strategy documents emphasized the 
multipolarity concept seem consistently based in perceptions of threat to Russian 
national security or as worst case scenarios, such as US interference. The European 
states, on the other hand, were referred to as the hub of Russia’s traditional foreign 
policy. “The main aim of Russia’s foreign policy in Europe is the creation of a stable 
and democratic system of European security and cooperation” (FPC 2000:8). 
Although NATO and the EU shared, with only a few exceptions, the same member 
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countries16, the two clearly represented different agendas. Russia’s official strategy 
documents pointed to the qualities of these central actors in terms of US military 
superiority and NATO’s infidelity, and European partners in trade respectively.  
Whereas the 2000 documents specified multipolarity, the Annual Addresses barely 
mentioned the concept. Possibly, this may have come as a result of nothing more than 
variations in discursive practices. More likely, the concept was toned down in the 
years following the 11 September attacks. The Annual Addresses stressed multilateral 
cooperation as means of defence but did not point out multipolarity per se. But 
beyond a doubt, the text material content suggested that Putin still supported the idea 
of a world with several power centres. Already in Putin’s first Address he announced 
his concerns about Russia’s lack of political choice internationally. Russia had to 
rebuild its strength, but “not in defiance of the international community, not against 
other strong nations, but together with them” (Putin 2000:2). Furthermore, the 
Address of 2001 laid out the objectives of Russian foreign policy. It outlined the 
challenges and possibilities in international relations, strategic balance of national 
interests, importance to cooperate with Europe, and on NATO’s unilateral tendencies. 
And it ascribed Russia’s biggest problem to the tendency of NATO to ignore “the 
opinion of the international community and the provisions of international legal 
documents in its decision-making process” (Putin 2001:9), which was an implicit call 
for multipolarity.  
Nonetheless, Russia’s most important foreign policy task was to “combat 
international terrorism which is capable of destabilizing the situation not only in 
individual countries, but in entire regions” (FPC 2000:6). In effect, terrorism seemed 
to be the threat which was most unequivocally linked to Russia’s desire for 
strengthened international cooperation. For example;  
                                              
16 Of the European countries, only Austria (EU), Cyprus (EU), Finland (EU), Iceland (NATO), Ireland (EU), Malta (EU), 
Norway (NATO), Sweden (EU) and Turkey (NATO) were member states of only one of the two organizations as of 2007.  
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Using the framework of international agreements, there must be effective collaboration with 
foreign states and their law-enforcement and special agencies, and also with international 
organizations tasked with fighting terrorism. Broad use must be made of international 
experience of dealing with this phenomenon and there must be well-coordinated mechanism 
for countering international terrorism, closing all available routes for illicit weapons and 
explosives within the country and preventing their import from abroad (NSC 2000:10).       
More examples followed: “to fight it [terrorism] requires unification of efforts by the 
entire international community” (NSC 2000:2); the “Russian Federation calls for the 
further measures to intensify cooperation among states in this area” of combating 
international terrorism (FPC 2000:6) and Russian foreign policy should be designed 
to “develop international cooperation in the fight against transnational crime and 
terrorism” (NSC 2000:11). Such explicit appeal for international collective action 
was also found with regard to economic cooperation although not as directly.  
Immediately after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, President Putin urged 
that “the entire community should unite in the struggle against terrorism” (Drozdiak 
2001). If one isolates his comments in that context, Putin’s active support for the 
subsequent US led military intervention in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom 
was unsurprising. Yet, the world leaders and politicians were astounded. Scholars, 
however, were not equally astonished (Medvedev 2004). Putin made his choice also 
in spite of the views of the general public (Kolosov 2002) and the position of the 
majority of the Russian political elite (Yavlinsky 2002). According to an attendant at 
a special meeting among 21 leading politicians of Russia, the president invited some 
Duma representatives and members of the Upper Chamber to a discussion on what 
position Russia should take in this dramatic situation. Of these participants, one 
required Russia to support the Taliban, and only two said unconditional support to the 
anti-terrorist coalition was the right thing to do. All the other advocated Russia’s 
neutrality (ibid.). All things considered, it was anything but predetermined in 2001 
that the US led Operation Enduring Freedom was to receive Russian support in the 
war against terrorism. It became evident, however, that the international war against 
terrorism could indeed serve deeply entrenched national interests of the Russian 
Federation. Russia’s intolerance for acts of terror had been explicit in Russia’s 
strategy documents for as long as the Russia-Chechen conflict had persisted. 
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Whether or not this latter operation was an act of self-defence or an act of aggression 
was subject to legal interpretations. How to defend against this diffuse and non-state 
threat picture was also unclear. But the terrorist attacks on US homeland had however 
created a common basis for understanding the kinds of threats to international 
security facing the global powers. Russia agreed that, given the circumstances, a 
military response was both acceptable and efficient. For Russia, the war against 
terrorism helped reassure strategic stability in the post-Soviet RSC.  
Every Annual Address after 2001 thoroughly confirmed that international terrorism 
posed the main military threat to Russian territory. The main difference, however, 
from the strategy documents of 2000 was the unreserved self confidence in the 
rhetoric: “Russia is one of the most reliable guarantors of international stability. It is 
Russia’s principled position that has made it possible to form a strong anti-terrorist 
coalition” (Putin 2002:9). And “an adequate response to the most serious threats of 
the 21st century […] can only be provided by the united efforts of the international 
community (Putin 2004:8). Bringing together an international alliance was therefore a 
valuable “tool to coordinate intergovernmental efforts in fighting this evil” (Putin 
2003:8). Because Russia had managed to remain the unquestionable power in the 
post-Soviet space, in 2001 Putin gained a unique opportunity to reclaim influence at 
the global level.  
How can Russia’s threat perception be described after President Putin had confirmed 
his unconditional support to his US counterpart? Did the Russian discourse on 
multipolarity transform or did it simply evaporate as an idea? Maintaining a dialogue 
with USA was mentioned already in the first Annual Address after the 11 September 
attacks, i.e. in the 2002 Address. Putin asserted that “no one [nation] intends to be 
hostile towards us – no one wants this or needs it” (Putin 2002:2). He continued to 
describe this new amity in terms of a “constant dialogue with the United States, and 
work on changing our qualities with NATO” (Putin 2002:10). This second appeal 
referred directly to the 2002 summit of the NATO – Russia Council which resulted in 
“A New Quality” (NATO 2002). The Address of 2004 was the next in which such 
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explicit reference to Russia’s non-threatening, and even constructive, dialogue with 
the USA occurred (Putin 2004:8). Besides the Russian support of major European 
partners and the threat from US dominance, most other allusions to a multipolar 
world were interpretations of economic interactions such as the Group of Eight and 
the non-proliferation regime. These were distinguished as important “global 
partnership[s]” (Putin 2003:4). While new meaning was included into the 
multipolarity concept, Russia’s official opinion of UN authority and its “provisions of 
international law” (Putin 2003:8) was never omitted. For example, it “is extremely 
important that if a certain threat intensifies [that a] universally acknowledged 
decision-making mechanism exists. Undoubtedly, the most important such 
mechanism we have is the UNSC” (Putin 2003:8). And finally, Putin discussed the 
formation of an international regime against terrorism as a way to distribute power 
among the world’s great powers.   
Russia values the anti-terrorist coalition. We value it as a tool to coordinate 
intergovernmental efforts in fighting this evil. Furthermore, successful co-operation within 
the coalition and within the framework of international law may become a good example of 
consolidation of civilised nations in fighting common threats (Putin 2003:8).  
In Russian security discourse, the US war against international terrorism led to more 
direct appeals for international cooperation. This was because first, the fight against 
international terrorism mirrored Russia’s political and military campaign in 
Chechnya. And second, these international efforts had the potential of being 
organized as an intergovernmental force in agreement with modernist characteristics. 
This coincided with Russia’s petition for state-to-state cooperation rather than the 
more post-modernist regional or limited institutional initiatives. In other words, 
Russia’s contribution to the war against terrorism was decided on from a domestic 
point of view. Also the multipolarity concept had been used instrumentally. As 
already suggested, the multipolarity concept originated in opposition to US political 
and military dominance in international relations. This sentiment, however, was more 
or less abandoned as such after 11 September 2001. This idea of balancing act behind 
the multipolarity concept did not disappear from Russian strategic thinking but 
emphasized instead an alignment on the global level. Russia’s focus on several global 
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powers persisted but now in cooperation with the USA as well. In other words, 
although it originated from a negative US sentiment, after 11 September 2001 this 
concept was used to confront neither the US nor NATO. The multipolarity concept 
continually emphasized the respect for international law, legitimate use of force, and 
intergovernmental efforts across the previous Atlantic divide.  
In sum, a wide interpretation of multipolarity as a theoretical concept directed 
attention to international cooperation in political, economic as well as in military 
affairs. According to Russian foreign policy priorities, it was repeatedly important to 
sustain multipolarity in the international system in order to conserve the UN 
authority. A more threat based interpretation of multipolarity showed that the concept 
embodied an explicit opposition to US world dominance. Lately, it has been 
important to fight international terrorism and reduce the potential fallouts from ethnic 
upheavals. Then again, multipolarity as such is not mentioned once in any of the 
Annual Addresses.   
In the Russian view, the Russian state was and should be the dominant power in the 
post-Soviet RSC. But this status made it both vulnerable and a target for acts of 
terrorism. The Russian public could relate to the impact of terrorist acts and 
sympathized strongly with the American people, but disagreed in principle on the US 
plans to use force (Kolosov 2002). Furthermore, the war against international 
terrorism also encompassed the prospects for military security on post-Soviet 
territory. It had become obvious that Russia was no longer able to maintain its 
political supremacy in the post-Soviet RSC (Shmelyov 2005). A strategic partnership 
with the Western forces, therefore, could prove to more effectively restore Russian 
influence. Hence, the USA helped ensure Russian national interests and did what 
Russia could not do alone, which was to reduce the security threat from the Central 
Asian region along Russia’s southern borders (Legvold 2002). Such efforts conveyed 
the possibility of military cooperation with the USA. As stated by the Russian 
General Vladimirov, “Now, it is finally clear to all that the West and Russia have a 
common enemy – Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organizations. If we are not 
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complete idiots, we must not let this opportunity slip” (Reynolds 2001). The Minister 
of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, specified to the contrary that there was no “basis for even 
the hypothetical possibility of NATO military operations on the territory of Central 
Asia” (ibid.). Nevertheless, the USA opened a base for military and humanitarian 
operations in Uzbekistan, made use of an international airport in Tajikistan, and 
attained an over-flight right from Kazakhstan as well as refuelling privileges from 
Turkmenistan (Nichol 2007). While the Russian administration had quietly opposed 
the increasing US influence in Central Asia prior to 11 September, the President soon 
gave his consent17. During the 1990’s, Kremlin had followed a more timid than 
proactive foreign policy of pursuing multipolarity. Although put on hold for a few 
years in reaction to NATO’s enlargement in 1995 and the Kosovo intervention in 
1999, this latter strategy was generally pursued and had in turn forced the USA to 
marginalize Russia (Skak 2003). Putin’s positive support of the US led war from 
2001 was definitely Russia’s most aggressive foreign policy vis-à-vis the West.  
As a result, the war against terrorism consolidated military power, and restructured 
and reorganized some of the rather unclear post-Cold War international relations. It 
remained uncertain, however, in late 2001 whether or not the improved US – Russian 
relations was a temporary partnership in the face of a common threat or a long term 
strategic Russian shift towards the West (Jensen 2001). Obviously, the Russian 
leadership was less articulate on the principle of non-intervention in the war against 
terrorism. The principles of international law still guided Russian foreign policy but 
the centre of attention shifted from a balancing act to a policy of state-to-state 
cooperation against international terrorism.  
                                              
17 According to Polikanov and Timmins (2004:228), President Putin had already consented to US military bases in Central 
Asia before the Minister of Defence was informed.  
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4.3 Russia's Economic Position  
The global distribution of power is structurally centred on the world’s most advanced 
economies. In order for a country to ameliorate its international image and increase 
access to decision making in world affairs, economic efficiency and integration could 
serve as essential instruments. Up until President Putin’s first period, the pursuit of 
these ends had not been fully considered in Russia. Three developments stand out as 
particularly challenging to Russia. First, the disastrous legacy after Yeltsin resulted in 
a series of tough financial reforms. Second, the geo-economic landscape made 
economic progress in Russia more difficult and costly than it did to other comparable 
countries18 (A. Lynch 2002). And lastly, Russia’s economic prospects were thwarted 
by dropping international oil prices between 1991 – 1994 and 1996 – 1998 (Williams 
2007). Russia had indeed special needs and President Putin was set on the creation of 
a Russia specific development plan that took these challenges into consideration.  
In response to these weaknesses, Putin (1999) issued a long term strategy for Russia 
in the 21st century that aimed to learn from the lessons of the past and quickly 
overcome the protracted crisis. Putin’s grand strategy attended to the Russian idea of 
being a politically integrated society that shared fundamental ideological orientations 
and basic values, such as democracy, security and open market relations. From this 
followed that growth in the economic sector and economic integration could 
effectively ensure national security. Hence, incentives for international cooperation 
such as strength and independence in the strictly competition-based self-help system 
were repeatedly securitized. 
                                              
18 A number of constant obstacles make full and efficient exploration of Russia’s natural resources difficult. Most 
importantly perhaps, Russian rivers flow from south to north and make access to world oceans difficult. Russian 
infrastructure is thus forced to rely on land transportation rather than on the five times cheaper transportation at sea (A. 
Lynch 2002:40-42). 
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III Vulnerability: Economic Weakness 
President Putin’s administration recognized economic progress to be the 
indispensable stepping stone in their grand political project and stressed that “[w]e 
have no time for a slow start” (Putin 1999:213). “Russia’s national interests may be 
assured only on its basis of sustainable economic development” (NSC 2000:2). This 
was because “a stable economy is the main guarantor of a democratic society and the 
very foundation of a strong state that is respected in the world” (NSC 2000:2). In his 
millennium speech, President Putin elaborated thoroughly on the economic 
possibilities and challenges ahead. The international economic system valued labour 
of material production increasingly less than service within the secondary and tertiary 
sectors. And in this world system of globalization, national economic development 
would have been improbable without broad integration of Russia in the system of 
world economic ties (FPC 2000:6).  
The economic situation in the year 2000 posed both internal and external threats to 
the country’s national security. For example, adverse economic development could 
encourage separatist aspirations and lead to increased political instability and thus 
threaten national security (NSC 2000:3). And the Russian elite perceived independent 
economic policy to be a principal task in order to ensure national security (NSC 
2000:6). Moreover, the political administration regarded interaction with Western 
European states as another “important resource for Russia’s defence of its national 
interests […] and for the stabilization and growth of the Russian economy” (FPC 
2000:9). President Putin repeated in his first Annual Address what he had already 
stressed in the Strategy Documents; a “stable economy is the main guarantor of a 
democratic society, and the very foundation of a strong nation that is respected in the 
world” (Putin 2000:2). The accumulation of foreign debt was conversely a sign of the 
state’s weakness (Putin 2000:5). And because of inflation, a soaring foreign debt and 
the devaluation, the Russian economy had lagged so far behind that it would have to 
grow at unprecedented rates if not to reduce “our capabilities in international politics 
and the world economy” (Putin 2002:2). Loosing advantage in the international 
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marked economy was accordingly a perceived threat to Russian economic and 
national security.  
In order to ensure Russia’s “worthy” position in the world, “the rapid transition to 
stable economic growth are of decisive importance” (FPC 2000:3). A glance at 
Russia’s economic prospects compared with European standards illustrated that this 
rapid transition was easier said than done. An annual growth in GDP of eight percent 
over a fifteen year period would provide Russia with standards of living similar to the 
lowest echelon of Europe’s industrial countries, e.g. Portugal (Putin 1999:213). In the 
year 2000, Russia’s GDP had increased by an annual seven percent but the total GDP 
in US dollars remained less than half of the GDP in 199719 (A. Lynch 2002:32). 
Hence, economic growth was already taking place but the distance to go had 
stretched simultaneously. It was moreover crucial that economic transformation came 
about fast and that Russia sought her own model for renewal. Because, the “future 
depends on combining the universal principles of the market economy and 
democracy with Russian realities” (Putin 1999:212). Furthermore, a balanced 
monetary policy should “reduce Russia’s dependence on external borrowing and 
[contribute] to strengthen its presence in the international financial and economic 
organizations (NSC 2000:7). Reducing dependence on foreign investments and loans 
was perhaps the main component of Russia’s post-Yeltsin recuperation.  
But it was not just the domestic character of economic stagnation that had been 
securitized, so was also the anarchic self-help system at the core of the world’s free 
economic forces. In this international economic system, no one had hostile intentions 
any more towards Russia or any other country because there was no need. 
Admittedly, however, no one was willing to help either and instead “we need to fight 
for a place in the ‘economic sun’ ourselves” (Putin 2002:2). President Putin described 
economic competition as a fight for markets, for investment, and for political and 
economic influence. In this game Russia must remain strong and show muscles. Putin 
                                              
19 See Table 1 in Appendix. 
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gave henceforth exclusive political priority to all sorts of competition. “Today, the 
countries of the world compete with each other in all economic and political 
parameters”, such as in the security level of the country, in the attractiveness of the 
business climate, and in the quality of state institutions (Putin 2002:2). 
Similarly, the Annual Addresses to the Federal Assembly contained frequent 
references to political opportunities on the international level with regards to 
economic integration. As soon as Putin became president, it was clear that he 
intended to turn the negative trend in Russian economy but it was not until the second 
Address that he explicitly pronounced integration as a word of opportunities. 
“Integration with Europe is one of the key areas of our foreign policy” (Putin 
2001:9). For example, Putin regarded membership in the WTO as a tool, with which 
those who knew “how to use it become stronger” (Putin 2002:8). Economic 
integration seemed to be an either-or situation. Moreover, “the biggest success comes 
to those countries that consciously use their energy and intelligence to integrate 
themselves into the world economy” (Putin 2003:4). From now on the expansion of 
the EU meant new markets, more investments and “new possibilities for the future of 
Greater Europe” (Putin 2004:8). He pointed not just to integration with the great 
Western powers but also to border and interregional cooperation as an important 
source of trade and economic ties (Putin 2004:8). Interestingly, the vision of Russia’s 
political independence among global partners was evident in all documents. It 
seemed overall clear that the Russian Federation could not prosper and develop in 
absence of political and economic strength.    
The way of arguing in the Annual Addresses, furthermore, was somewhat more 
proactive and solution based than what was the case in the Strategy Documents. The 
former texts conveyed compelling arguments, such as “we need to fight” (Putin 
2002:2) as mentioned above, “we are building constructive, normal relations” (Putin 
2002:2), “we must take the next step and focus” (Putin 2003:1), and “we must grow 
faster than the rest of the world” (Putin 2004:2). The qualities of economic rhetoric 
were more convincing and almost emotional, maybe because implications of changes 
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in the national economy have direct effects on every individual citizen. And 
additionally, the general public was an extended recipient group of the Annual 
Addresses which logically stimulated the President to communicate with more 
animation. Although the provider and audience of the text material were the same in 
both cases, the president’s office and the Russian public respectively, the Annual 
Addresses may have obtained a more colloquially persuasive form in order to gain 
acceptance. Besides the underlying threat of being left out of competition, another 
economic incentive in international affairs was expressed as the threat from past 
performance. For example, “it is more important not to remember the past, but to 
look to the future” (Putin 2000:2). And, “[w]e have to learn the lessons for the future 
from today’s situation” (Putin 2001:6) and after the Address of 2003 and onwards, he 
started listing the economic achievements made. 
The growth of the economy, political stability and the strengthening of the state have had a 
beneficial effect on Russia’s international position. We have been able to a significant degree 
to make our foreign policy both dynamic and pragmatic (Putin 2004:8).   
Globalization and economic integration were perceived as an opportunity to advance. 
The Strategy Documents of 2000 clearly communicated that  
Russia’s national interests are directly related to […] globalization of the world economy 
[…], intensification of the role of international institutions and mechanisms in world 
economics and politics […], the development of regional and sub-regional integration in 
Europe (FPC 2000:3). 
With regard to globalization, the early text material added also a sense of scepticism. 
Or, there was at least an awareness of the challenges that surfaced in the wake of the 
globalization process. For instance, there was “a need for enhancing the efficiency of 
political, legal, foreign economic and other instruments for protecting the state 
sovereignty of Russia and its national economy in the conditions of globalization” 
(FPC 2000:4). However, the increasing globalization of the economy and of public 
international life was three years later part of the Russian game of economic 
integration. “No country today, no matter how big and how wealthy, can develop 
successfully in isolation from the rest of the world” (Putin 2003:4). The Russian 
economic restoration project adapted to the effects of globalization not least 
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rhetorically. While globalization was the condition, integration was ostensibly the 
required means for any country to enable economic progress.   
Therefore, in order to remain competitive, Russia’s foreign policy should be designed 
to ensure “full-fledged involvement in global and regional economic and political 
structures” (NSC 2000:11). Implicitly, “full-fledged involvement” meant membership 
in the most influential international financial institutions. In 1997, Russia became 
officially the eighth member of the Group of Seven although they had joined the 
summit meetings already since 1994. However, Russia was not an equal member of 
the Group of Eight and the Russian delegation could thus not participate in any of the 
regular financial and economic discussions within the Group (Zwaniecki 2007). 
Nonetheless, “Russia attaches great importance to its participation in the Group of 
Eight” (FPC 2000:4). The priorities in foreign economic activities were “to pave way 
for international integration of the Russian economy” and “to expand markets for and 
of Russian products” (NSC 2000:7). Expanding Russian markets and incorporating 
“Russia into the international system of regulating foreign economic operation, above 
all the WTO” were all measures taken to ensure national security (Putin 1999:218). 
These economic reform plans in particular pointed to more investments, assist 
science-intensive production, combat the illegal economy, and to consistently 
integrate the Russian economy into world structures (Putin 1999:217).  
The economic dialogue between Russia and the EU started already before the signing 
of the PCA in 1994. Economic growth is the driving force behind relations with the 
EU. Russia’s economic policy, which was directed almost solely towards the 
European marked, aimed to ensure that Russia could act on her national interests in 
tough competition internationally.  The EU on its part directed its first Common 
Strategy on Russia and pursued a Russia first policy, which strongly suggested that 
Russia was a favoured partner in trade.  
Similarly, relations with the EU were of key importance. Russia “views the EU as 
one of its main political and economic partners and will strive to develop with it an 
intensive, stable and long-term cooperation devoid of expediency fluctuations” (FPC 
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2000:8). As sketched out in the strategy documents, Russia “shall collaborate with 
other states in a multilateral format, first of all, within the framework of specialized 
international agencies, and on a bilateral level” (FPC 2000:6). Maintaining good 
relations with European states was part of Russia’s traditional foreign policy, in 
which the main aim was to create a “stable and democratic system of European 
security and cooperation”. However, multilateral association with Western Europe 
could not, and did not intend to, replace bilateral cooperation with Russia’s main 
partners Britain, Germany, Italy and France. Interaction primarily with these most 
influential states was an important resource for Russia’s defence of its national 
interests in Europe and world affairs (FPC 2000:9).    
Russia’s main partner in trade was definitely the European Union. Data derived in 
2004 from Eurostat and the Russian State Statistical Service showed that nearly sixty 
percent of Russia’s total export went to the EU (European Commission to Russia 
2005:11). At the same time, Russia received fifty percent of all import from the EU20. 
EU’s import from Russia more than doubled from 1999 to 2000, and increased by 
more than one third during Putin’s first presidential period (ibid.)21All trade 
compared showed that fifty-seven percent of Russia’s trade was with the EU, whereas 
only six percent of all EU’s trade was with Russia! Conclusively, the Russian 
President found it pertinent to support integration in order to achieve national 
economic growth and cooperation with the most influential states of the world, and 
particularly with the EU. Whereas relative scepticism was communicated in the 
Strategy Documents, the Annual Addresses contained more hands-on description of 
the situation in which Russian economy found itself. They all pointed out some 
strategic implications and threats of economic inefficiency if Russia did not manage 
to maintain economic strength on the international arena.  
                                              
20 See Figure 1 and Figure 2 in Appendix. 
21 EU imports from Russia summed up to 25.918 million Euros in 1999, 60.918 in 2000, and equalled 80.538 million Euros 
in 2004.   
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In sum, the discourse in the text material showed that arguments based on domestic 
vulnerabilities and the international context were simultaneously at play. The 
domestic based argumentation focused on economic mismanagement of the past and 
the urgent need for a Russia specific development model. On the global level, the 
most important interests were financial independence and economic integration, none 
of which could take place without the foundation of a strong state. Economic 
integration was not the main aim in itself but rather the indispensable means for 
Russia to find its “place in the ‘economic sun’” (Putin 2002:2). The discourse on 
integration was clear on “full-fledged involvement” (NSC 2000:11) but more 
ambiguous in regards to globalization processes and effects. The state should design a 
protectionist foreign and economic policy in the era of globalization (FPC 2000:4) at 
the same time as it was necessary to adapt to this process. On the whole, the 
securitization of economic weakness incited a spectre of motives that each could 
serve as goals in and of themselves but were more importantly part of a grand 
strategy.    
President Putin acquired international recognition by means of active emphasis on 
cooperation and designed a quite innovative strategy of internationalization. 
According to Bobo Lo (2003), he avoided any mention of strategic competition with 
the West and silenced thus the post-Cold War premise of zero-sum balancing. Putin 
simply did not buy the neo-realist idea, which inferred that success of the West 
necessarily implied Russia’s defeat in one way or another. Putin successfully 
transformed zero-sum strategic thinking into a more positive-sum thinking of 
international power relations, at the same time as he always kept his assumptions of 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’ at an arms length (Lo 2003:74-75). In this perspective, the 
Kremlin continued to pursue policies that best served their interests but did so not for 
the sake of competing with or merely provoking fragile bonds to Western parties as 
they had been doing earlier (ibid.). Putin had securitized Russia’s qualities as an 
independent actor in military, political and economic interactions on the global level.   
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4.4 Final Remarks 
The international context and regional developments, together with abundant 
research, have been crucial for this in-depth discussion of Russia’s strategic 
motivation in relation to NATO and the EU. But before coming to conclusions, this 
study will revert to a relevant empirical discussion on Russia’s foreign affairs. It has 
been argued that Russia’s association with the West has never been a strategic 
partnership, or at least not intended as such (Nikonov 2005:68), but a somewhat 
consistent policy based on pragmatic solutions. This argument is often based in case 
studies of the conflict in Chechnya (Cornell 2003, Baev 2004, Bowker 2004) and in 
comparative studies of EU – Russian relations (Borko 2001, Vahl 2006). It is not 
within the scope of this thesis to conclude on either argument but instead allude to the 
academic debate.  
Russia’s relentless focus on territorial integrity was understandably reinforced by the 
outcome, or lack of such, in the war in Chechnya. The conflict prolonged and the so 
called second war did not seem to recede but quite the contrary. The North Caucasian 
region had become to the Russian Federation what the Baltic republics were to the 
Soviet Union, or similar to what Poland had been to the Russian Empire, namely “an 
inherently alien and subversive element” (Trenin 2001:179). The spill over effect of 
secessionism and Islamism was a real threat to the Russian border policies, and could 
actually lead to Russian intervention against the Chechen networks in Georgia and 
Azerbaijan. The former NATO intervention in Kosovo had brought hope to the 
possibility of a quick solution also in Chechnya. At least in the Russian public there 
seemed to be relative eagerness for a second military campaign in Chechnya at the 
turn of the millennium. The Chechen society in majority adhered to Islam and 
according to some press reports22, the conflict was assumingly bolstered with 
                                              
22 Russian media reported that Osama bin Laden had supported Chechen secessionists by sending mercenaries from 
Afghanistan and Yemen among other to fight in Chechnya (Oliker 2001:40). Russian intelligence found that the radical 
group led by Basaev received from Osama bin Laden alone a sum of $30 millions, and up to $600 000 from various 
funding units in Saudi Arabia (Bowker 2004:263). 
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political radicalization from other parts of the Muslim world. According to Cornell 
(2003), the conflict in Chechnya had congealed and developed Islamic characte
and received military support from Arabic mujahedeen. After a series of Chechen 
terrorist acts against the Russian public, President Putin entered the Kremlin with a 
promise to get the Chechnya problem under control. After a series of Chechen 
terrorist acts against the Russian public, President Putin entered the Kremlin with a 
promise to get ‘the Chechnya problem’ u
ristics 
nder control.  
And that is what he has done and continues to do. This acknowledgment lead to Baev 
(2004) to conclude that Russia’s war in Chechnya was not about victory in the war, 
but rather about the domestic benefits to the President’s regime a prolongation of the 
war could provide. In illustration, after the 2002 Dubrovka theatre hostage taking, a 
Council of Europe correspondent wrote that “both sides appear more intransigent 
than ever” (Bowker 2004:264), and the possibility of an agreeable solution to the 
conflict was meagre. According to Baev (2004), the tight vertical power structure that 
Putin established and the type of absolute political control that he exerted should have 
proved sufficient to end the war, if he wanted to. Instead, Chechen secessionism was 
placed instrumentally in the political discourses of international terrorism and 
conveniently absolved Putin from the disproportionate use of force he was accused of 
before 2001. For example, the response from states leaders in the West expressed 
their concern and support for the Russian population and particularly the Russian 
President in the wake of the tragedies at the Dubrovka Theatre in 2002 and at the 
School Number One in Beslan in 2004. Jack Straw, then British Foreign Secretary 
said, “we will be expressing complete solidarity with [Russian] President [Vladimir] 
Putin and the Russian government, as well as profound sympathy and concern for 
those poor children and their teachers” (Blua 2004). Putin’s strict condemnation of 
antiterrorism received support also from the UN Secretary, German Chancellor, and 
the Canadian Prime Minister. The European Commission expressed however a 
sceptic view on Putin’s handling of the hostage taking (ibid.). 
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Even in economic relations, Russia relentlessly emphasized own independence. In 
1999, the pioneer European Union Common Strategy on Russia stimulated Russia to 
issue a more concrete European policy. It stirred up “a more sober understanding of 
the EU by Russian officials, with increasing recognition that EU enlargement, in 
particular, might represent a cause for concern” (D. Lynch 2003:58). One example of 
this maturity was the responding 1999 Russian Medium-Term Strategy23 (MTS), 
which emphasized that Russia intended to decide on her own about the future and 
progress of Russia’s political development and also about the integration process. 
Dov Lynch noted that the two documents together illustrated a “strategic gap between 
Moscow and Brussels” in which the CSR was characterised by a value laden focus on 
Russia’s need to change profoundly, while the MTS highlighted Russia’s national 
interests and sovereignty (D. Lynch 2003:59). However, at the following EU – 
Russian Summit in 2000 held in Paris, Putin said that Russia no longer perceived EU 
enlargement as a threat but as an opportunity. Analysts saw this comment as a break 
with the earlier position that EU’s eastern enlargement would cost Russian businesses 
their export markets. The Russian Security Council went as far as actually 
encouraging a common European defence policy because this might even lessen the 
current dependence on NATO and the USA. In that case, the Kaliningrad exclave 
could become a pilot-project in EU – Russian cooperation (Lambroschini 2000). 
What was decided on, however, was that Russia and the EU would start a formal 
dialogue on common interests in the energy sector. And, in March 2001, Russia 
entered into the World Trade Organization (WTO).   
Studies of Russian and EU responses to the concept of strategic partnerships have 
also leaned towards pragmatism rather than strategies in their conclusions. In a 
comparison of EU’s and Russia’s strategy documents, Vahl (2006) found that the EU 
strategy towards Russia was a relatively weak derivative of an association agreement, 
whose objective was to persuade Russia to converge on EU economic and political 
                                              
23 The official name is the Medium-Term Strategy for Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union 
(2000 – 2010).  
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norms. In contrast, the more instrumental Russian strategy saw the EU in geo-
political terms as a useful agent for a multipolar world. Allegedly the EU was “saying 
‘be like us’, whereas Russia [was] saying ‘help us reduce US hegemony’” (Vahl in 
Emerson 2001:22). And a similar conclusion was reached five years later. Although 
both Russia and the European Union agreed on the common goal of having a 
strategic partnership, “there seems to be fundamental differences between the two 
parties as to what such a strategic partnership should entail in policy operational 
terms” (Vahl 2006:21).  
As opposed to EU’s post-modern interests, Russian national interests in a strategic 
partnership encouraged traditional modes of international cooperation based on the 
Westphalian states system. This latter kind of state-to-state partnership limited 
political exchanges to mere traditional foreign policy assumptions based on inter-
governmental politics or “state-centric realism” (Webber and Smith 2002:12, Kagan 
2008). Because only in such forms could Russia hold on to the principle of non-
interference (Vahl 2006:21). As a result, the conceptualization of strategic partnership 
depended fully upon different interpretations of what were the preferred premises. 
And this particular one was a partnership founded on common interests or common 
enemies without a foundation of deeply shared values. In essence, EU’s Common 
Strategy on Russia (CSR), revealed an ambitious document that aimed to help 
develop Russia to become a pluralistic democracy governed by rule of law and based 
on an open market economy. The Russian response (MTS), on the other hand, did not 
even once mention Russia’s transition to democracy and market economy on the 
document’s list of main goals and priorities (Borko 2001:131). In a study of the CSR 
from a Russian point of view, Borko (2001) found that both of the CSR and the MTS 
documents emphasized own efforts as means to achieve their common goal. For 
example, the EU aims to “assist” and “contribute” to Russia’s transition, whereas the 
MTS aims to utilize EU’s economic potential and experience in order to obtain fair 
competition in the social market economy (ibid.:131-132). This signalled clearly an 
imbalance of expectations.      
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5. Conclusion 
5.1 Summary 
Revealing the motivations behind Russia’s increased cooperation with the two main 
security organizations in the west, namely NATO and the EU, has been the focus of 
this project. The examination was based on an in-depth analysis of three strategy 
documents from Putin’s first presidential period, and five annual addresses to the 
Federal Assembly over a five-year period. Intertwined with Russia’s national 
interests, three variables in particular were considered: state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, multipolarity and alignment, and economic weakness.  
Admittedly, Russia’s relations with the West are much more complex than the three 
variables to which this thesis has been limited. This particular project has been 
structured by the conceptualization of national interests in the strategy documents. Of 
the core interests referred to in the documents, the most important was the 
determination by the Russian Federation to restore the country’s status as a great 
power. Guided by Regional Security Complex Theory, this thesis has allowed for the 
inclusion of inter-subjective perceptions of national security, which in turn have 
enabled a wide interpretation of both vulnerabilities and opportunities facing Russia.  
5.2 Main Findings 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the main findings of this thesis reveal that all three variables 
played a role in explaining the Russia-specific development plan. The variables can, 
however, be ordered hierarchically in terms of their impact on the strategic 
partnership with the West. The domestic non-territorial variable – Russia’s economic 
weakness – had a greater effect on Putin’s outreach plan than the other two. A strong 
Russian economy would beneficially position the country relative to other global 
powers and provide access to western institutions to which Russia had been 
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previously denied. The second variable – state sovereignty and territorial integrity - 
while also domestic in nature, was also of utmost importance to Putin’s plan. 
Interestingly, this variable is linked both to Russia’s economic weakness (resulting in 
a vertical power structure to ensure state sovereignty) and to the third variable under 
consideration - alignment with the US to fight terrorism. Alignment was a crucial 
aspect of the strategic partnership but played initially a lesser role since no one could 
have predicted the events of September 11, 2001. Putin had started a dialogue with 
NATO, symbolically through the Secretary-General’s visit to Moscow, but the 
strategic cooperation included practical cooperation that sped up in 2002. In the end, 
this third variable did provide the Russian President with a unique opportunity to 
finally bring western countries onside vis-à-vis the country’s troubles with Chechnya.   
In general, President Putin engaged in strategic partnerships with the West as part of 
a grand strategy of normalization. The normalization of Russia as a great power 
emerged from a foreign policy critique against the ideological anti-Western 
proclamation under Primakov. Putin shared the Primakovian strategic goals of power, 
stability, and sovereignty. The means of achieving these, however, now included 
state-driven economic liberalization, economic and security cooperation with the 
West, and being a dominating world power especially in the former Soviet area 
(Tsygankov 2005:141). Putin’s grand strategy in his first presidential period, 
therefore, was neither a “drive to the West” nor a “drive to the sea”, as opposed to his 
predecessors (Heikka 2000:4). Instead, it seemed to be a combination of more than 
one direction in strategic thinking. Putin’s grand strategy of normalization was the 
result of a realistic assessment about Russia’s relative position in the world. The 
solution to Russia’s lack of influence in international decision-making forums was to 
please both European great powers as well as to maintain a dialogue with the 
American superpower. President Putin designed a Russia specific strategy to regain 
international recognition and moulded Russia into a normal great power that could 
gain from economic cooperation with the EU in particular. A crucial aspect of this 
strategy was domestic in nature – Russia had to overcome its own economic 
weaknesses in order for this goal to be realized. 
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The economic dialogue between Russia and the EU involved two tales. The Russian 
monologue emphasized economic integration while the European monologue 
demanded democracy. Putin ignored the European demands. For him, economic 
integration was more important because it provided Russia with opportunities to 
participate directly in international decision-making. In the era of globalization, Putin 
(2003:4) clearly stated that no country could advance in isolation from the rest. The 
discussion of Russia’s economic position relative to the world’s great powers also 
pointed to the urgency of Russia’s economic restoration project. To become an 
influential economic player Russia had to achieve economic stability, become less 
dependent on foreign creditors, undergo post-industrial transformation, and integrate 
economically. Russia securitized elements of the international economy that best 
preserved its national interests. Countries such as Russia that were striving for strong 
and exclusive economic positions were inclined to securitize issues and conditions 
that could compromise economic prosperity. Difficult access to, and transport of, 
economically important resources may have stimulated protectionist policies. 
Russia’s comparative advantage existed only in energy and raw material sectors, 
upon which the national economy had grown increasingly dependent (Brada in Oliker 
and Charlick-Paley 2002:26).      
Putin emphasized Russian uniqueness and sovereignty together with concepts of 
economic liberalism and sought, first of all, economic relations with the West. This 
means that he did not necessarily make Russia act as a competitor of the great powers 
of the West, but aimed to consult with them as equal partners and to mutual 
advantage. That being said, he had a clear understanding that he would always strive 
for his goals without compromising sovereignty. This two-tiered approach to 
modernization curiously led one political analyst to draw the line between President 
Putin and Peter the Great (Johansen 2006:7). They were both said to have assimilated 
the Western approach, such as gaining economic benefits and new technology, but 
stressed at the same time Russia’s independence and pre-eminence (ibid.). In other 
words, President Putin wanted a share of Western advanced technology and economy 
but not import its culture.  
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Power in the international power constellation, however, was defined by economic 
capabilities and by a specific set of values and norms. The Russian economic agenda 
illustrated effectively that the modernist state structure could be willing to incorporate 
some of the values of post-modernist states, such as economic liberalisation. Putin 
amended the norms of the game and chose to combine the principles of market 
economy and democracy with Russian realities. This amalgamation, however, could 
only with difficulty encompass the post-modernist values of democratic state building 
and open market economy. This duality has become known in political analyses of 
Russia as “managed democracy” (White in Allison 2006:22) or “sovereign 
democracy” (Rumer 2007:46). Both labels refers to the Russian government’s interest 
in protecting the Russian society and economic enterprises from foreign interference.   
Putin, to the contrary, institutionalized a socio-political cohesive state structure and 
this focused on the equally significant domestic variable – state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. His bureaucratic reforms facilitated more vertical power 
domination because only a strong state could enable a self-reliant Russia in the 
international system. Political dominance on the sub-global levels of affairs was a 
logical part of the same idea. Putin restructured state power so that domestic 
vulnerabilities could not hamper Russian ambitions in foreign affairs. This was 
recaptured in his second address where Putin (2001:2) asserted the domestic level to 
be politically more important than the international. Putin tactically implemented the 
policies that he thought would serve Russia best, but without compromising Russia’s 
sovereignty. State sovereignty and territorial integrity was a motivating and 
contributing factor to strategic cooperation because this embodied Russia’s culture 
and history as a great power. Disruption and fragmentation were therefore threats to 
Russian identity and Russian privileges. And the war in Chechnya signalled that the 
Russian state was willing to defend itself from secessionism using all means 
necessary.   
Tight vertical consolidation of bureaucracy and economic integration were the main 
components in Putin’s Russia-specific development model. However, Russia’s vast 
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territory, together with a difficult geo-economic landscape (A. Lynch 2002) and 
significant national interests abroad, diminished the chances of being included as a 
member of Western institutions. But full-fledged membership was never the 
intention. In terms of economic development, Russia had special needs. These needs 
effectively demanded an interventionist state corresponding to traditional Russian 
strategic thinking on the state’s role in economic affairs. Russia continued a 
protectionist economic policy that restrained Russia’s own plan of a regional free 
trade zone (Buzan and Wæver 2003:411). Hence, Russia’s great power normalization 
produced policies aiming to preserve power while directing the rhetorical focus on 
economic integration.  
Of the last variable (alignment with the West in its fight against terrorism), its impact 
on strategic partnership with the West was significant but only because it intersected 
with the domestic interests of strategic stability in the region.  
Russia’s official response after 11 September 2001 can be contrasted with the 
reactions to NATO’s intervention in 1999. Putin’s act of alignment impelled Russian 
military analysts to use the word “revolutionary” (Medvedev 2004). Was it a change 
of strategic thinking? Not necessarily. Since the Russian Federation was established 
in 1991, its foreign policy was neither fixed in building alliances nor in balancing 
acts. Russian foreign policies have intermittently emphasized Westernism, 
multipolarity, and currently more or less strategic cooperation with the West. Soon 
after President Putin was appointed he promoted multipolarity. He aimed to facilitate 
the formation of a world power system in which “[e]conomic, political, science and 
technological, environmental and information factors are playing an ever-increasing 
role” (NSC 2000:1). Sectors of the society, such as economic and information 
sectors, were areas in which European countries had advanced more than the US 
superpower. Implicitly, Russia’s multipolar aspiration was a balancing act against the 
US superpower. This further illustrates that Putin had intentionally preferred 
economic relations with European states as main partners. Economic integration 
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showed that Russia had national interests in common with EU member states and that 
Putin was an interested and interesting partner in trade.  
When Putin aligned, at least provisionally, with the USA in the war against 
international terrorism, he contravened the Russian public and the Russian elite. He 
became known as the first state leader to have sent his condolences to President Bush. 
The constructivist understanding of securitizations and threat perceptions gives 
meaning to these kinds of adjustments in political affiliation. But was it a result of 
new threat assessments that led President Putin to pledge unconditional support in the 
fight against international terrorism? Was it a pragmatic response to a new conflict 
formation? Or was it part of a strategic plan?  
This thesis has contended that the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 provided 
President Putin with an opportunity to play his Chechnya card on the global level. 
The findings of this thesis correspond with arguments of other scholars that the US 
led war on terrorism created a “window of opportunity” (Stent and Shevtsova 2002, 
Baev 2004, Clément-Noguir 2005:238). President Putin was presented with an 
opportunity to ally with the world’s superpower and receive political support for 
Russia’s own war in the south. Putin’s immediate response granted Russia 
international respect and did not obstruct the Russia specific development plan. 
While this was presented as a strategic u-turn in the international press, those in 
academic circles could not agree on whether it was part of a strategic westernization 
plan or simply an instrumental solution. Putin’s reduced focus on multipolarity and 
his eminent alignment were nonetheless parts of a plan that Putin had already 
endorsed already in 2000. Conveniently, the Russian leadership also wanted to 
sustain political control among the CIS countries as a way to secure Russia as a great 
power in the world. Russia’s alignment with the USA as official strategy in foreign 
affairs was likely based on a realistic assessment of lost influence, and on Russia’s 
prospects of regional dominance and relative position internationally. In the wake of 
11 September 2001, the international security discourse revisited geo-political 
strategic thinking and a rhetorical resort to militarism. And Russia was invited to play 
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a key role (Neumann 2005:18-19). As a result, the alignment with the US superpower 
in the fight against terrorism helped Russia re-establish strategic stability in the larger 
post-Soviet space.  
To sum up, the variables of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, balancing and 
alignment, and economic weakness all contributed to Putin’s strategic partnership 
with the West. The variables had differing impacts on Russia’s outreach however, 
with the two based on domestic imperatives providing a greater motivation than the 
one set in international security concerns. Nevertheless, the fight against terrorism did 
provide Russian leadership an opportunity to bring onside western powers that had 
previously condemned the administration’s actions against Chechnya.  
Of course, this study of Russian interactions with NATO and the EU has not been 
exhaustive enough to make claims of causality. This thesis has revealed, however, 
that Russia’s strategic thinking was based on the ambition to restore Russia’s global 
great power status. Clearly, economic relations with the EU enabled Russia’s 
economic restoration and consisted mainly of national interests in economic growth. 
The economic rewards of normalization have had the effect of reinforcing Russian 
great power potentials. Likewise, Russia’s response to acts of terrorism and the need 
to protect state sovereignty and territorial integrity against terrorism were important 
driving forces in Russia’s state-to-state cooperation from 1999-2004. At the same 
time Russia became an attractive and important player in the US led ‘coalition of the 
willing’ that launched a global war on terrorism. By seeking closer cooperation with 
the West, with NATO and the EU, “the man who gets things done” (Herspring 
2005:2) engaged in pragmatic and strategic partnerships with the West, partnerships 
that were to secure – and secured – Russia’s return as a great and influential global 
power.  
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Figure 1: Russia’s Exports by Country of Destination 
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Figure 2: Russia’s Exports by Country of Origin 
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